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ABSTRACT
A relatively recent phenomenon of patents covering tax saving
strategies has generated an overwhelmingly negative response
from the tax community. This Article reviews current patent
laws in the context of tax strategy patents and business method
patents (of which tax strategy patents are a subset), and then
analyzes the major concerns voiced by opponents of tax strategy
patents. The Article suggests that the lack of searchable prior
art and patent examiner expertise are temporary problems that
can and will be adequately addressed by the Patent Office and
the tax community.
In addition, while the tax community has put forth many
thoughtful concerns regarding why tax strategies should be
outside the realm of patentable subject matter, this Article
contends that many of the concerns arise from either a
misunderstanding of the patent laws, or dislike and fear of
change, rather than from fundamental reasons to exclude tax
strategies from patenting. The Article does, however,
recommend some slight changes to the laws relevant to this area,
including
e requiring patent applicants to base tax strategy patent
applications on current tax laws, and to identify and explain the
primary tax laws relevant to an alleged invention,
* reviewing all tax strategy patents under a strict
obviousness standard based on the recent KSR v. Teleflex
Supreme Court case, and
0 amending the tax laws to make the use of patented tax
strategies reportable transactions.
Minimizing the issuance of "bad" tax strategy patents will
result in a patent system whose value to the public correlates
with the value of the tax planning profession as a whole. Thus,
interested parties should focus their efforts not on eliminating
tax strategy patents, but on increasing the quality of issued
patents and improving the tax laws under which any such
patents would operate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that every congressional tweak of tax laws' sets off a
flurry of patent applications-companies and individuals race to
the Patent Office in an attempt to capture patent protection for
strategies made beneficial by new laws. Eventually, the stakes
get so high that financial "wildcatters" and influential lobbyists
apply for prophetic patents, hoping to capture patent protection
for yet-to-be-determined changes in tax laws. Meanwhile,
unscrupulous businesspersons advertise "patented" tax
strategies that violate tax laws, misleading their clients into
committing tax fraud. While overstated, the possibility of such
scenarios has led a nervous tax community to investigate and
discuss the patent system.
Many tax planners awoke abruptly to the issue of patented tax
saving strategies in January 2006, when Wealth Transfer Group
LLC sued John W. Rowe, Aetna Inc.'s executive chairman,
alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 ("the '790
patent"). 2 According to its title, the '790 patent relates to a
method of "[establishing and managing grantor retained annuity
trusts funded by nonqualified stock options."3 While the case
settled in March 2007,4 it highlights broad concerns associated
with tax strategy patents.
The tax community's reaction has been overwhelmingly
negative toward tax strategy patents. Members of Congress,
taking notice of the debate, have sought to limit tax strategy
patents.5  Ironically, although patents concern the right to
exclude, 6 it is the tax community who seeks to exclude the patent
1 This Article repeatedly refers to the Internal Revenue Code and related
regulations and rules as simply "tax laws."
2 See Complaint at 1-2, Wealth Transfer Group LLC v. Rowe, No. 3:06-cv-
00024 (D. Conn. Jan. 6, 2006).
3 U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999).
4 See Consent Final Judgment Regarding Settlement Agreement, Wealth
Transfer Group LLC v. Rowe, No. 3:06-cv-00024 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 1999).
5 See S. 681, 110th Cong. § 303 (2007) (seeking to prohibit a patent if "the
invention is designed to minimize, avoid, defer, or otherwise affect the liability
for Federal, State, local, or foreign tax"); H.R. 2365, 110th Cong. (2007) (seeking
to prohibit damages or injunctions "against the taxpayer, the tax practitioner,
or any related professional organization" who uses a tax planning method).
6 Although many think a patent gives its owner the right to make or use an
invention, it actually gives the patent owner the right to exclude others from
making or using the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). Patent owners are
often precluded from operating within their own patents, due, for example, to
preexisting unexpired patents on components of the patented subject matter, on
broader versions of the invention, or on methods needed to produce the
32920081
HeinOnline  -- 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 329 2008
ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH.
system from the tax strategy area. The antipathy toward tax
strategy patents has evoked some surprising arguments from
within the tax community, including that tax-savings ideas are
socially wasteful;7 thus, calling much of the tax profession into
question. The tax community has put forth many thoughtful
concerns, but this Article contends that many of the concerns
arise from either a misunderstanding of the patent laws, or
dislike and fear of change, rather than from fundamental reasons
to exclude tax strategies from patenting.
This Article analyzes many of the tax community's concerns
and is divided into six main sections. The first four sections
(Sections II-V) analyze tax strategy patents in light of the basics
of patent law. Next, because tax strategy patents are closely
related to "business method" patents, the fifth main section
(Section VI) reviews some of the arguments against business
method patents. Finally, the last main section (Section VII)
reviews objections and concerns accompanying the rise of tax
strategy patents that were not discussed in Sections II-V. This
Article ultimately concludes that Congress, the courts, and the
Patent & Trademark Office ("PTO") should generally treat tax
strategies like business methods. This Article suggests some
minor modifications to the laws, including:
instituting a "state of the law" affidavit requiring patent
applicants to base tax strategy patent applications on current tax
laws and to identify and explain the primary tax laws relevant to
an alleged invention;8
reviewing all tax strategy patents under a strict obviousness
standard based on the recent KSR v. Teleflex Supreme Court
patented subject matter. See id.
7 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
RELATING TO THE PATENTING OF TAX ADVICE, 25 (2006), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-31-06.pdf [hereinafter JCT (stating that "no social
gains from novel tax planning strategies exist as any gain to the user of the
strategy is offset by losses to the Treasury, and therefore the resources devoted
to producing and using such strategies represent a net loss to society."); Issues
Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Ellen Aprill), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp (select "109th Congress"; click
"Change Congress"; click "Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax
Advice" hyperlink; then click "Ellen Aprill" hyperlink) [hereinafter Hearing on
Patenting Tax Advice] (stating that tax strategy patents undesirably will cause
a "reduction in federal tax revenues, generating revenue losses that would have
to be made up from other sources").
8 See infra Section VII.A.2.d.
330 [Vol. 18.2
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case;9
requiring notifications to clients and prospective clients that
patented tax strategies are not necessarily legal; 10
mandating publication for all tax strategy patent applications
(as opposed to only those that will also file for foreign patent
protection) within 18 months from the application date;l and
amending the tax laws to make the use of patented tax
strategies reportable transactions. 12
II. PATENT LAW AS AN INCENTIVE FOR INNOVATION
Patents, rooted in the Constitution, 13 grant the owner "the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention" in the U.S.14 Most economists agree that,
in theory, the patent system can promote technological progress
(and thus benefit society) by creating incentives for individuals
and businesses to engage in research and development. While
individuals and businesses naturally desire technological
progress, they will generally not engage in the optimal amount of
research and development if, due to ease of copying by
competitors, it is difficult to recover the R&D costs. 15 Thus, the
patent system trades the below optimal research and
development investment for the economic inefficiencies of a
limited monopoly in the form of a patent.
Patent law has four main requirements for obtaining a patent:
the alleged invention must be (1) eligible subject matter, (2)
useful, (3) new (novel), and (4) non-obvious. While this Article
will discuss each of these requirements in detail, a brief
introduction to the concepts will be beneficial. First, the eligible
subject matter requirement excludes laws of nature, natural
9 See infra Section VII.A.2.b-c.
10 See infra Section IV.B.
11 See infra Section VII.A.2.a.
12 See infra Section VII.B.1.b.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the right "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to ... inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries.").
14 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2000).
15 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 1, p. 6 (2003) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O03/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC Report] (citing
ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 13.4.1, at
288 (2003)). Of course, businesses may employ other types of protection,
including copyright and trade secret protection.
2008] 331
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phenomena, abstract ideas, and pure algorithms. Second, the
utility requirement ensures that an invention have a specific and
substantial use, such that it is operable to provide a particular,
real-world benefit. Third, the novelty requirement prevents
patents on inventions that have previously been known or
disclosed to the public. Fourth, the non-obviousness requirement
ensures that the idea is "inventive," as opposed to an obvious
change to known ideas or inventions.
Tax strategy patents resemble so-called "business method"
patents, which as their name implies, cover methods of achieving
business objectives. 16 Business method patents have long been
the subject of criticism, and many argue that business methods
should not be eligible for patenting. Because tax strategy
patents are closely related to business method patents, the
majority of arguments against business method patents apply
with equal force to tax strategy patents. In addition, tax
professionals and other critics specifically question whether tax
strategies should receive patent protection.
III. TAx STRATEGIES AND BUSINESS METHODS AS ELIGIBLE
SUBJECT MATTER FOR PATENTING
A. Introduction to Eligible Subject Matter
The PTO will grant utility patents based on applications 7
falling into one of four eligible categories: processes (also referred
to as methods 8 ), machines, articles of manufacture, compositions
16 The PTO classifies patents and patent applications into classes and
subclasses based on the technology field; the majority of business method
patents fall under Class 705 ("DATA PROCESSING: FINANCIAL, BUSINESS
PRACTICE, MANAGEMENT, OR COST/PRICE DETERMINATION") and
patents concerning tax reduction techniques fall into Subclass 36T of Class 705.
USPTO.gov, Patent Classification Schedules,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc705/sched7O5.htm (last visited Oct.
8, 2008).
17 Patents originate from applications filed with the PTO and generally
expire twenty years after the application date. The PTO reviews patent
applications for various technical requirements and compares a claimed
invention to any known scientific information and technology, referred to as
"prior art," to determine whether the application deserves to issue as a patent.
USPTO.gov, General Information Concerning Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html (last visited Oct. 8,
2008). Filing a patent application and prosecuting it to issuance can cost
between $10,000 and $25,000 or more. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance
at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2001).
18 Process (or method) patents generally cover a series of steps or actions, as
[Vol. 18.2
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of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.19
Together, these four categories cover an expanse of eligible
subject matter that includes "anything under the sun that is
made by man."20
Ineligible subject matter includes laws of nature, natural
phenomena, abstract ideas, and pure algorithms. 21 The inability
to patent pure algorithms would at first blush appear to preclude
patents on computer programs, and thus, many business
methods and tax strategies (which often de facto require a
computer to implement). The Federal Circuit (the appellate
court with exclusive jurisdiction for all patent appeals from
district courts and the PTO), however, in a series of cases has
held that algorithmic implementations may be patented if they
are practically applied, such as, but not limited to, by
programming them into a computer to provide a useful result.22
Thus, beginning in the 1990s, courts increasingly expanded the
scope of eligible subject matter to include a variety of computer
related inventions. Courts were more reluctant, however, to
expand the scope of eligible subject matter to include patents on
business methods.
opposed to the remaining categories which cover things having various
components. DONALD S. CHISUM, Glossary to CHISUM ON PATENTS (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. 2007). The distinction between method patents and machine
patents has become somewhat blurred given the prevalence of patenting
computer-implemented inventions, which one can either describe as a machine
(which performs a series of steps in the form of calculations or operations) or a
series of steps (performed on a machine). See Jeffrey R. Kuester & Ann K.
Moceyunas, Patents for Software-Related Inventions (Mar. 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, http://www.kuesterlaw.conswpat.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2008)).
19 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
20 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citation omitted).
21 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (1980); See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
22 See generally Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958
F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (upholding a patent that incorporated an algorithm
into a machine-processed analysis of electrocardiograph signals to help gauge
the risk levels of ventricular tachycardia); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that a programmed general purpose computer was
eligible subject matter because it "is not a disembodied mathematical concept
which may be characterized as an 'abstract idea,' but rather a specific machine
to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result."); AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at
1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (confirming that claims need not be tied to a
machine in order to be patentable subject matter); see also Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981) (holding that when the algorithm was incorporated
in a useful process, the subject matter was statutory).
2008]
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B. Business Methods as Eligible Subject Matter for Patenting
Having expanded the scope of eligible subject matter to include
practical applications of algorithms, courts also had to decide
whether "business" methods likewise constituted patentable
subject matter. As mentioned above, business methods represent
a broad class of inventions covering methods of achieving
business objectives. Because tax strategy patents relate closely
to business method patents, the history and debate surrounding
business method patents bears directly upon tax strategy
patents.
Even into the 1990s, courts and the PTO had an aversion to,
and refused to grant, business method patents on the ground
that they were outside the scientific or technological realm
reserved for patent protection. 23 The tide turned in 1998 when
the Federal Circuit officially legitimized business method patents
with its holding in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin., Inc.24  The patent 25 in State Street involved a data
processing system for implementing an investment structure,
Hub and Spoke®, whereby mutual funds (Spokes) pool their
assets in an investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a
partnership. 26 The trial court rejected the patent as not eligible
subject matter because it was directed to a mathematical
algorithm 27 and because it was a business method. 28
The Federal Circuit reversed and specifically denounced the
"ill-conceived" business method patent exception. 29 Thus, instead
of worrying whether a method claimed in a patent application
relates to a "business" method or some other method, courts and
23 See John. J. Love, Business Method Patents, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8
(Symposium 2000), available at http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7i2/love.html
(discussing the increased use of business method patents).
24 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
25 U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 11, 1991).
26 The invention allowed an administrator to monitor, record, and calculate
the data needed to maintain the partnership fund. The complex calculations
needed to be performed quickly, and thus, de facto required a computer. While
not necessarily characterized as a pure "tax strategy" patent, the '056 Patent
organized the mutual funds as a partnership solely for the beneficial tax
treatment. State St., 149 F.3d at 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
27 Id. at 1375 (reversing the trial court's "mathematical algorithm" rejection
in light of In re Alappat and related cases).
28 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp.
502, 514-16 (D. Mass. 1996).
29 State St., 149 F.3d at 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 18.2
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the PTO should simply recognize that the invention is a "method"
(by virtue of which it is eligible subject matter for patenting) and
proceed to analyze the invention under the remaining statutory
requirements. 30 Because the remaining statutory requirements
of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness were not before the State
Street court, it remanded the case without analyzing the '056
Patent under these requirements. 31
While State Street involved a computer-implemented invention,
business methods need not use a computer. Recently, the Board
of Patent Appeals upheld a "pure" business method patent
application as encompassing eligible subject matter.32 The
patent applicant claimed a method of compensating a manager
based not only on the manager's individual performance within
the company, but also on the performance relative to the overall
industry.33 Troubled by the fact that the claims did not recite
any computer or machine-implemented steps, the patent
examiner rejected the application because the invention as a
whole was not in the "technological arts."34  In a rare
precedential opinion (split 3-2), the Board summarily overturned
the patent examiner's decision, noting that the Supreme Court
declined to adopt a "technological arts" test for determining
eligible subject matter.35 Absent a "technological arts" test,36 the
30 Id. at 1377.
31 After remand, the case settled. Douglas L. Price, Assessing the
Patentability of Financial Services and Products, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 141, 151
n.85 (2004). The '056 Patent's owner never litigated the '056 Patent again,
perhaps in part out of fear that a court would invalidate the patent under other
statutory requirements. For whatever reason, the '056 Patent's owner allowed
the patent to expire eight years early by failing to pay the maintenance fee
required in 2005. U.S. PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, NOTICE OF
EXPIRATION OF PATENTS DUE TO FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE FEE (May 3, 1995)
available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2005/weekl8/patexpi.htm.
32 See generally Ex parte Lundgren, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS 34 (Bd. Pat. App.
& Interf. 2005).
33 Id. at *1-3.
34 Id. at *7.
35 Id. at *10-11 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 201 (1981) (Stevens,
J. dissenting)).
36 Not all commentators have abandoned a form of "technology" restriction to
the eligible subject matter requirement. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1172 (1999) (defining
technology as "concerned with design, fabrication and transformation" of the
physical world); Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against
Software and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 845-47
(2003) (defining "technological risk" as a risk that a project may fail for reasons
other than the market/commercial non-acceptance).
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majority easily determined that the patent application
constituted statutory subject matter in light of Federal Circuit
precedent. 37 As in State Street, the Board did not analyze the
patent application under the statutory requirements of novelty
and non-obviousness. 38
C. Tax Strategies as Eligible Subject Matter for Patenting
While no case has yet considered whether tax strategy patents
are eligible subject matter for patenting, State Street and its
progeny clearly suggest that they are. Because tax strategy
patents are generally a subset of business method patents, one
would expect courts to uphold their eligibility unless good reason
exists to distinguish them. As will be discussed infra, this Article
argues that no strong reason exists to consider tax strategies as
outside the realm of patentable subject matter.39
IV. TAx STRATEGIES AND THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT
In addition to the eligibility requirement, an invention must
have utility. Utility requires that an invention have a specific
and substantial use such that it is operable to provide a
particular, real-world benefit. Terms such as "specific utility,"
"substantial utility," and "operability" have been used by
different authorities to define the boundaries of the utility
requirement. 40 The exact terms used are less important than the
substance behind them, and one should keep in mind that,
generally speaking, in patent practice the utility requirement is
easily met.41
In general, utility requires an invention to have "a significant
37 Ex parte Lundgren, 2005 Pat. App. LEXIS at *6 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.
2005) (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
38 See id. at *7,11,106-08 (discussing how the Board's analysis was focused
on whether or not the claims were limited to the technological arts as
statutorily required, and based on the subject matter as a whole). The patent
application eventually issued as U.S. Patent No. 7,065,495 (issued June 20,
2006) was entitled "Method and apparatus for preventing oligopoly collusion."
39 See infra Section VII.B.
40 See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, § 2.3(a),(b)
(8th ed. 2007); Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 passim (Jan.
5, 2001); In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
41 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("The threshold of utility is not high: An invention is 'useful' under section 101
if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit.").
336 [Vol. 18.2*
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and presently available benefit to the public."42 The term
"significant" should not be read too broadly, and its main purpose
is to preclude "throw-away" utilities, such as using a complex
invention as a landfill. 43 Even games and novelties can meet the
utility requirement. 44 Hence, one expects that every taxpayer
would agree that an invention reducing tax obligations addresses
a legitimate benefit sufficient to meet the utility requirement! 45
Note also that the utility requirement does not require the
invention to be the best-working invention in its area. 46 Thus, a
tax strategy patent need not reduce taxes to an absolute
minimum, or even a large amount.
Related to the requirement that an invention must provide a
presently available benefit to the public, is the requirement that
a patent's claims must be operable to achieve an intended
result.47  The operability requirement "applies primarily to
claims with impossible limitations. '" 48 Thus, a tax strategy that
purports to lower a taxpayer's obligations, but through oversight
or mathematical error actually raises them, would not have
utility. Other than a mathematical error, how might the utility
42 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also In re Dodson,
292 F.2d 943, 947 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
43 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 40, at 1098 ("This requirement
excludes 'throw-away,' 'insubstantial,' or 'nonspecific' utilities, such as the use
of a complex invention as landfill."). But see Nathan Machin, Comment
Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of Section
101 of the Patent Act, 87 CAL. L. REv. 421, 433-34, 437-40 (March 1999)
(describing potential nominal utilities, such as a paperweight, and highlighting
the disincentives against claiming such nominal utilities).
44 Patents having general utility include U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed
Nov. 17, 2000) (a method for swinging on a swing); U.S. Patent No. 5,683,314
(filed Jan. 14, 1997) (a water activated hopscotch game); U.S. Patent No.
5,522,507 (filed Oct. 3, 1995) (a kit for enacting the tooth fairy fable); U.S.
Patent No. 4,834,657 (filed May 20, 1988) (a "punishment wheel" for choosing a
punishment for misbehaving children).
45 As best stated by Judge Learned Hand, "[any one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes." Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
46 See Juicy Whip, Inc., 185 F.3d at 1366 (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519, 534 (1966); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d
1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903));
see also Custom Accessories Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that an invention may not be as effective as an existing
one, but may still be patentable).
47 HARMON, supra note 40, at § 2.3(b).
48 Id.; see also CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (citing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
HeinOnline  -- 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 337 2008
ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. [Vol. 18.2
requirement affect tax strategy patents?
Much of the jurisprudence surrounding the utility requirement
developed in response to certain mechanical, chemical, and
biochemical discoveries. 49  As such, its applicability to tax
strategy patents, which garner their usefulness in large part
from positive law, remains unclear. For example, the oft-cited
test developed in In re Chilowsky centers around the laws of
science, not human-enacted statutes. 50 Under the Chilowsky
framework, if the invention "can be readily understood and
conforms to the known laws of physics and chemistry," then it
meets the utility requirement.51 If, however, the alleged utility
"seems clearly to conflict with a recognized scientific principle,"
such as a perpetual motion machine or a device for cold fusion,
the patent applicant must present strong evidence to establish
utility.5 2 On the other hand, if the invention is "of such a nature
that it [cannot] be tested by any known scientific principles," the
applicant must demonstrate the utility of invention. 3 Based on
In re Chilowsky, the PTO has adopted a similar test for reviewing
patent applications. 54
49 See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1966) (noting that the
patentability of chemical processes have since accelerated); In re Fisher, 421
F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For example, utility requires that the
invention work for a particular purpose, rather than to a broad purpose
achievable by a class of inventions, such as precluding a claim of utility for
chemicals with no known use except as objects of tests to determine a more
specific utility. Because patented tax strategies would seem to have a clear
particular purpose, this aspect of the utility requirement would not seem to
impact tax strategy patents much.
50 In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
51 Id. The utility requirement does not require that the inventor has actually
built the invention, or that the invention works well. Rather, it only requires
that the explanation of how the invention works makes logical sense in light of
the laws of physics, chemistry, etc. As evidence that the invention need not be
put into practice, consider the following issued patents: U.S. Patent No.
5,305,974 (filed July 23, 1991) ("A propulsion system for spaceships wherein a
first electromagnetic projectile launcher (EMPL) accelerates 'smart' projectiles
into space and on appropriate trajectories to rendezvous with a distant
spaceship at some later time."); U.S. Patent No. 5,058,833 (filed Mar. 6, 1990)
("A spaceship is provided with a freely spinning propeller mounted on the front
end. The propeller significantly reduces resistance to flight and also deflects
space particles which might otherwise slow the craft.").
52 Chilowsky, 229 F.2d at 462 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
53 Id. (citing In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1931), in which the
invention claimed "[tihe production and generation of an electromotive force
from the accumulation of the ether waves of an unknown potential, from the
general field of ether wave electric medium.").
54 See Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 40, at 1098.
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As mentioned, because the utility analysis, including the
Chilowsky framework, has historically focused on scientific
principles (e.g., physics and chemistry), it may have little impact
on tax strategy patents, except to exclude those containing
obvious mathematical errors. At least two scenarios could
require an in-depth utility analysis for tax strategy patents or
applications. First, applicants might purposefully misstate the
tax laws, such as, by basing a strategy not on current tax laws,
but on possible future tax laws. Second, applicants might rely on
the current black-letter tax laws, but misinterpret or stretch the
meaning of the law as in the case of an abusive tax shelter.
A. The Utility Requirement Might Prevent a Tax Strategy Patent
Based on Misstated Black-Letter Law
Rent seeking and wildcatting applicants could apply for a tax
strategy patent based on anticipated changes in the tax laws (i.e.,
a prophetic patent), ignoring current tax laws. "Rent seeking"
refers to an entity that attempts to make money by manipulating
the economic environment (e.g., by lobbying), rather than by
making a profit through trade and industry.5 5 Rent seeking
applicants would, thus, apply for a prophetic patent, hoping to
influence Congress to pass a law covered by their patent. The
term "wildcatting" refers to early oil prospectors who drilled risky
and expensive exploratory oil wells in regions not known to
contain oil.56 Wildcatter applicants would thus apply for
prophetic patents hoping the law will change to cover their
patent. In either case, applicants for such prophetic patents
would not merely misinterpret the tax laws, but would
purposefully base their applications on a possible future law.57
Because the utility standard requires a presently-available
benefit to the public, it can be argued that prophetic patents
would fail the utility test. In other words, a patent application
based on non-existent tax laws would not be operable in the
"real" world. On the other hand, tax laws, unlike most scientific
55 Economist.com, Research Tools, Economics Glossary,
http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm (search "rent-
seeking") (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
56 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1967 (4th ed.
2000).
57 As discussed in Section VII.A.2.d, infra, prophetic patents in the tax
strategy area should be prohibited to prevent the "capture" of an entire tax law
and to remove the possibility of patent holders improperly influencing the
government to adopt tax laws based on their patents.
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"laws," will change from time to time (and do so more often than
many people would like). Given the mutability of tax laws
relative to scientific laws, courts might find that the utility
requirement does not preclude prophetic patents. The better
answer, however, is to recognize that scientific "laws" do change
as our understanding of science develops 58 and tax strategy
patents should be treated no differently. Thus, a prophetic tax
strategy patent or application based on a purposeful
misstatement of statutory or black-letter law should not meet the
utility requirement.
B. The Utility Requirement Would Likely Not Prevent a Patent
Application Based on an Abusive Tax Strategy
In a second scenario, patent applicants might base applications
on questionable interpretations of existing tax laws. As opposed
to applicants who base their applications on possible future tax
laws (discussed in the preceding sub-section), these applicants
base their applications on existing tax laws, but stretch the
meaning of those laws to achieve questionable tax strategies.
Thus, the strategy is operable under existing tax laws, but may
or may not be legal. While the distinction between the two
scenarios may appear small, there is strong reason to believe
that the utility requirement will not prevent applications based
on abusive tax strategies.
Abusive strategies could potentially receive patent protection
because an inquiry into utility will likely not consider whether an
invention is against public policy or whether it is permissible
under tax law. Once upon a time, society's morals factored into
the utility analysis,5 9 but courts have since come full circle.60
58 For example, the classical understanding of the law of conservation of
matter (i.e., that matter cannot be created or destroyed) was proved to be
violated in special relativity, in which matter is converted to massless energy
(Einstein's famous E = mc').
59 As stated by Judge Story, "[a]ll that the law requires is, that the invention
should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound
morals of society. The word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act in
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral." Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018,
1019 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
60 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
The requirement of 'utility' in patent law is not a directive to the Patent and
Trademark Office or the courts to serve as arbiters of deceptive trade practices.
Other agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration, are assigned the task of protecting consumers from fraud and
340 [Vol. 18.2
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Thus, while Judge Story in 1817 opined that "a new invention to
poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination, is not a patentable invention,"61 the PTO has since
granted patents on toxins for toxicological warfare, 62 gambling
devices, 63 a board game that can be used as an alcoholic drinking
game, 64 and a method of euthanizing a mammal. 65 In this
regard, the Honorable Mark Everson, Commissioner of the IRS,
stated that "[t]he grant of a patent for a tax strategy has
absolutely no impact on [the] IRS's determination of the
effectiveness or the legitimacy of the strategy under tax law."
66
The PTO agrees with the IRS's position, as indicated by James
Toupin, General Counsel at the PTO, in his testimony before the
House Committee on Ways and Means: "[T]he Federal Circuit
[Court of Appeals] has stated that there is no clear provision that
allows the USPTO to reject an invention solely on the grounds
that the invention may be against public policy."67 Thus, the
PTO and the IRS consider tax strategies in respective
administrative vacuums, and one agency's ruling does not affect
the other.
Despite the PTO's and IRS' stated positions, many fear that
the average tax strategy consumer may fail to appreciate the
distinction between patentability and legality.68 Unknowing
deception in the sale of food products.
Id.
61 Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
62 U.S. Patent No. 3,060,165 (issued Oct. 23, 1962) (covering a method of
making ricin, a toxin that inhibits protein synthesis and considered the world's
most potent plant toxin) (on file with author).
63 Ex parte Murphy, Sagan, Rosenthal, and Ostrowski, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
801, 802 (B.P.A.I. 1977) ("[W]hile some may consider gambling to be injurious to
the public morals and the good order of society, we cannot find any basis in 35
U.S.C. 101 or related sections which justify a conclusion that inventions which
are useful only for gambling ipso facto are void of patentable utility.").
64 U.S. Patent No. 5,690,333 (filed July 30, 1996).
65 U.S. Patent No. 5,290,775 (filed June 3, 1991).
66 Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (statement of Hon. Mark
Everson, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service).
67 Id. (Statement of James Toupin, PTO General Counsel) (citing as
examples, a patent on a method of making drinking alcohol that issued during
prohibition, a patent on a radar detector that is illegal in some jurisdictions,
and a patent on a method of preparing ricin toxin useful for toxological
warfare).
68 See, e.g., Charles F. Wieland III & Richard S. Marshall, Tax Strategy
Patents-Policy and Practical Considerations, 35 No. 5 BNA TAX MGMT.
COMPENSATION PLAN. J., 123, 130-31 (2007); Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants, Analysis and Legislative Proposals Regarding Patents for Tax
Strategies, (Feb. 28, 2007), available at
20081
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consumers, impressed by an advertisement of a patented
strategy, 69 may assume that the strategy is legitimate, when in
reality, it contravenes tax laws and subjects the consumer to
liability. While Congress has broad power to declare particular
types of technologies unpatentable, 70 it probably need not take
such drastic measures for tax strategy patents.
Instead, the PTO and IRS could, as a first step, require
purveyors of patented strategies to provide clients and
prospective clients an official notice that a patented strategy is
not necessarily legal. The notice would be similar in concept to
"black box" type warnings on drugs and cigarette packages. Of
course, because tax strategies are not generally sold or
advertised in containers like drugs and cigarettes, tax
practitioners would need to provide notices in conjunction with
patented tax advice in a manner similar to how doctor offices
provide privacy notices (and require acknowledgment thereof).
Assuming wealth is an indicator of sophistication in tax
practices, wealthy and sophisticated consumers of tax planning
advice, who would appear to be the vast majority of the
beneficiaries of tax strategies eligible for patenting, 71 would
likely understand such warnings. Even less sophisticated
consumers would arguably comprehend a plainly written
warning, or at least have a chance to inquire further.
Perhaps an unscrupulous opportunist will one day con
http://tax.aicpa.org/Resources/Tax+Patents/AICPA+Urges+Congress+to+Addres
s+Tax+Strategy+Patents.htm [hereinafter AICPA].
69 The Wealth Transfer Group, Inc. advertises prominently on its home page
as follows: "If you own non-qualified stock options, we have a patented
technique to help you increase the value your family will receive." Wealth
Transfer Group, http://www.wealth-transfer.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
70 Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000) (excluding patent protection "for any
invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear
material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon"); see also S. 681, 110th Cong.
§ 1 (2007) (seeking to prohibit a patent if "the invention is designed to
minimize, avoid, defer, or otherwise affect the liability for Federal, State, local,
or foreign tax") available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/legislation.xpd
(Select "Search" hyperlink; then enter "S. 681;" then select "Full Text" hyperlink
of "Bill Text;" then select "Download PDF").
71 Tax strategies available to the less wealthy are more likely to be obvious
(see Section V.B, infra) because they will involve routine methods based on clear
provisions from the tax laws. Less wealthy individuals will likely rely on the
standard deduction, obviating the need for creative tax strategies, or will be
unwilling to pay for professional tax advice for creative tax strategies. Even if a
"good" (i.e. non-obvious and not illegal) patent issues on an idea with broad
applicability, ideas with broad applicability would appear to be the ones society
should most want to encourage, at least from the taxpayer's perspective.
[Vol. 18.2
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innocent consumers with an illegal patented strategy, but stiff
penalties against such purveyors would decrease abuse. In
addition to penalties already in place, 72 a patent for an illegal
strategy should be declared unenforceable. An owner of a patent
for an illegal tax strategy could not only lose the patent (and the
costs associated with obtaining it), but could also be subject to
disgorging profits and even criminal penalties.
V. NOVEL AND NON-OBVIOUS TAx STRATEGY PATENTS DESERVE
PATENT PROTECTION
Having reviewed the first two patent law requirements of
eligible subject matter and utility, this Article turns now to the
final two primary requirements of novelty and non-obviousness.
Since the Federal Circuit's State Street decision officially
legitimized business methods as eligible subject matter, business
method patent applications have risen from 1,500 in 1998 to
around 7,000-8,000 applications per year in the last few years.
73
Similarly, patents granted on business methods increased from
about 400 in 1998 to about 1,000 per year in the last few years.
74
While the number of tax strategy patent applications is not
published information, there are about sixty issued tax strategy
patents as of July 2006. 75 The increased number of business
method patents has led critics to argue that the PTO is allowing
too many non-deserving patents for business methods and tax
strategies.
Such criticisms relate to the concepts of novelty and non-
obviousness, which in turn relate to the concept of "prior art."
72 IRS.gov, Civil and Criminal Penalties-Abusive Tax Schemes,
http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcementarticle/O,,id=1064 6 1 ,OO.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2008).
73 Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (Statement of J. Toupin,
PTO General Counsel).
74 CATALINA MARTINEZ & DOMINIQUE GUELLEC, OVERVIEW OF RECENT TRENDS
IN PATENT REGIMES IN UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND EUROPE 3 (2003),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/32/11728593.pdf.
75 Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (Statement of J. Toupin,
PTO General Counsel). The PTO has yet to publish the number of tax strategy
patent applications, but a rough estimate can be made by counting the number
of published tax strategy patent applications. This number, however, will
exclude both those applications that have been pending for less than 18 months
and those for which a request for non-publication has been filed (which may
only be filed if the applicant agrees not to file any foreign applications based on
the U.S. application). Generally speaking, applications for tax strategies began
to increase in 2003, and there has been a steady flow of applications since then.
3432008]
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The novelty and non-obviousness requirements generally prevent
someone from patenting an invention that has been previously
known or publicly used. Patent law refers to such previous
knowledge or use of a purported invention as "prior art." Prior
art consists of any prior public disclosure of the invention, such
as prior patents, publications (including articles, books, internet
postings, published laws and bills, advertisements, etc), or public
uses.
A. Novelty
Prior art will destroy a patent claim's novelty7 6 (i.e., will
anticipate the patent claim) if any one piece of prior art teaches
each and every limitation 77 of the claimed invention.78 Under
Section 102 of the patent laws, "art" must have been available
within certain statutory time frames to qualify as "prior" art
under the novelty and non-obviousness standards. 79 Generally
speaking, art may qualify as prior art in two primary ways.80
First, under Section 102(a), art will qualify as prior art if it was
76 35 U.S.C. § 102, which covers novelty, states in most relevant part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States ....
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
77 The patent claims, which appear as numbered paragraphs at the end of a
patent, define the metes and bounds of the invention and govern the right to
exclude others from making the invention. See, e.g., SRI Int'l v. Matsushita
Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is the claims that
measure the invention."). Claims consist of one or more limitations (also called
elements), with each element usually separated by a semi-colon. ROBERT C.
FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING §§ 2:7, 2:8 (Practicing
Law Institute, 5th ed. 2006). For example, a (very rudimentary and non-novel)
claim to a method for compensating a sales employee could comprise three
limitations: (1) providing a base compensation for an employee; (2) measuring
the employee's sales against a target quota; and (3) providing a bonus
compensation in proportion to the employee's sales exceeding the quota.
78 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
79 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (requiring either (a) that the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication before the applicants invention or
(b) that the invention was patented or described in a printed publication or in
public use or on sale more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent.).
80 See id.
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(a) publicly known or used by others in the U.S. or (b) published
(i.e., in a patent, journal, on the internet, etc.) anywhere in the
world before the date of invention by the patent applicant.81 The
date of invention, while sometimes difficult to place, is described
as the date by which the inventor had both conceived of the
invention and reduced it to practice.8
2
Second, under Section 102(b), art will qualify as prior art if it
was (a) in public use or on sale in the U.S. or (b) published
anywhere in the world more than one year before the United
States patent application filing date.8 3 The patent application
filing date is a fixed date determined by when the applicant
submits the application to the PTO.8 4 The reason for the
separate provisions (102(a) and (b)) is somewhat unique to U.S.
patent law. The purpose of 102(b) is to provide applicants with a
one-year window from the time of their (or anyone's) public
disclosure of the invention until they must apply for a patent, so
that they may test the commercial viability of the invention
before spending money applying for a patent.
8 5
For example, Inventor A may invent something on January 1,
81 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2000) (emphasis added).
82 Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1576-78 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
83 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
84 See id.; see also 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 3.08 (2007).
85 See, e.g., Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Construction, 98 F.3d
1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1996), further appeal, 172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam)
The on-sale bar of § 102(b) represents a balance of the policies of allowing the
inventor a reasonable amount of time to ascertain the commercial value of an
invention, while requiring prompt entry into the patent system after sales
activity has begun .... Thus the statute limits the period of commercial sale or
offers of sale of an invention to one year, before the patent application must be
filed or be forever barred.
Id.
Most countries, including those in the European Union, do not provide a one-
year window for commercial testing. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT, VOLUME 2, at § 6.02 (Deneil C. Targowski ed., 2007)
[Some] other countries ... do not have a comparably liberal provision. Both the
Strasbourg Convention on the harmonization of European national patent laws
and the European Patent Convention define prior art to include 'everything
made available to the public by means of a written or oral description' before
the effective filing date, which includes a prefiling disclosure by the applicant-
inventor. Article 55(1) of the latter convention provides a very restricted six-
month grace period applicable only to registered international exhibitions and
disclosures that result from a breach of a confidential relationship.
Id. (citations omitted).
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2006, then publicly use it in the U.S. on August, 1, 2006, and
then apply for a patent on August 1, 2007.86 Under these facts,
prior art under 102(a) must be publicly available before January
1, 2006 (the date of invention), while prior art under 102(b) must
be available before August 1, 2006 (one year before the
application date).
Some critics have misunderstood Section 102(b) to provide an
opportunity for a patent applicant to capture87 or base inventions
primarily on a new tax law once it is published.88 The argument
asserts that applicants could read a new tax law and apply for a
patent capturing that law as long as they do so within a year of
the publication of the law.8 9
Consider, for example, Applicant T learning of a new tax law
published on January 1, 2006. Applicant T applies for a patent
on August 1, 2006. Some critics seem concerned that because T
applied for a patent before January 2, 2007, the published law
will not invalidate the application. While it is true that 102(b)
will not invalidate the application based on the publication of the
law, 90 fears of widespread capturing of tax laws are unfounded
because Section 102(a) would prevent someone from patenting
the recitation of the law. 91 Under Section 102(a), the issued law
(not to mention the draft bill, etc.) serves as prior art because it
pre-dates the applicant's "invention" date.92
86 If the inventor waited until August 2, 2007, the August 1, 2006, prior
public disclosure would represent invalidating prior art under 102(b).
87 By "capturing" the law, I understand critics to refer to a patent whose
claims are merely a recitation of a law or are the only realistic way to comply
with or implement the law, not a patent covering a specific "loophole."
88 See, e.g., AICPA, supra note 68; JCT, supra note 7, at 26
However, while the first inventor defense protects a veteran tax
practitioner with regard to long-standing tax planning structures, it will
not protect a tax practitioner who develops a new tax structure based upon
a change in the tax law against a patent-holder who filed a patent
application on the same structure within a year or less of the tax law
change that rendered the structure possible or desirable.
89 See JCT, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing the one-year element of the first
inventor defense).
90 Of course, prior drafts of the bill, committee reports, and news of its
enactment would predate the actual issuance of the law and could qualify as
prior art if publicly available.
91 Prior art under Section 102(a) will also serve as prior art under Section
103 (regarding obviousness). See infra note 94 (listing the elements of the
obviousness inquiry). In addition, Section 102(f) prevents patents when the
applicant "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented." 35
U.S.C. § 102(f) (2000).
92 It is theoretically possible for an applicant to anticipate a change in the
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B. Non-obviousness
While one demonstrates an invention's lack of novelty with one
(and only one) piece of prior art, one demonstrates obviousness
by providing any combination of prior art pieces that together
would render the claimed invention obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in the relevant art93 at the time the invention was
made. 94 Just about anything qualifying as prior art under
Section 102 also qualifies as prior art under Section 103. An
obviousness inquiry may not rely on hindsight bias, and must
only consider the state of the art at the time of the invention.95
In the area of tax strategy patents, the obviousness doctrine
will have many applications, such as when changes in one or
more laws or regulations interrelate with other tax laws. 96 In
such a situation, each of the laws and regulations relating to the
invention will qualify as prior art (absent a prophetic patent
application). For example, consider how a change in a related
law affects a tax vehicle called a Grantor Retained Annuity Trust
law and apply for a "prophetic" patent, hoping that the law will go in the
direction of the application. See infra Section VII.A.2.d (discussing the problems
with prophetic patents and proposing a solution).
93 A person having ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person (as
opposed to the actual inventor) who has the capability of understanding the
technology in the pertinent art. Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224
F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000). For example, a person skilled in the relevant
art for a tax strategy patent might be a professional tax planner.
94 35 U.S.C. § 103, which covers obviousness, states in pertinent part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
95 When determining whether a claimed invention is obviousness, a court
engages in several factual inquiries: (1) what is the scope and content of the
prior art; (2) what are the differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue; and (3) what is the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and (4) any
secondary considerations favoring non-obviousness such as failure of others,
commercial success, and long-felt but unsolved need. Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1727, 1734 (2007) (quoting Graham v. John Deer Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
96 See William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress
Respond to this Judicial Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 299 (2007) (stating
that because "[t]ax planning opportunities are made possible by tax rules (or
absence of a rule)[,] ... [wihen a tax rule is released, tax practitioners at the
large accounting firms, law firms, and other tax professionals might pour over
the new rules in search of opportunities.").
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("GRAT").
A GRAT is an irrevocable trust where the grantor transfers
assets to the trust and is paid an annuity from the trust, and the
conditions of the GRAT must conform to various tax laws,
including Treasury Regulation § 25.2702-3. 97 At the end of the
GRAT term, the remaining assets are distributed to designated
beneficiaries and can avoid estate taxation. 98 While GRATs have
existed for years and were funded by a variety of assets, for many
years it was not possible to fund them with nonqualified stock
options 99  because the options were considered non-
transferable. 100
Now suppose the law changed to permit transfer of
nonqualified stock options. Would it be obvious to use the
nonqualified stock options to fund a GRAT? That was essentially
the question faced by the PTO when it examined the application
that became U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790.101 The application, filed
in 1999, stated that GRATs had existed for years, and that a
change in Rule 16b-3 of the Security and Exchange Commission
regulations allowed nonqualified stock options to be transferred,
including to trusts.'0 2 Nevertheless, the PTO granted a patent on
the application without a single rejection over prior art. 103
Many tax professionals bemoan the patent as an example of
97 Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3 (2007).
98 U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999).
99 A stock option is the right to purchase a specific number of shares at a
fixed price for a predetermined period of time. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1459
(8th ed. 2004). A nonqualified stock option is an option that does not receive
preferential tax treatment and is considered the equivalent of cash
compensation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1459 ( 8 th ed. 2004).100 Joseph E. Bachelder, The SEC's New Rule 16b-3, N.Y. L. J. (Jul. 31, 1996);
See U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter The '790 Patent].
101 See U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter The '790
Patent]. Claim 1 of the '790 patent reads in part:
A method for minimizing transfer tax liability ... comprising: establishing a
Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT); funding said GRAT with assets
comprising stock options, the stock options having a determined value at the
time the transfer is made; setting a term for said GRAT and a schedule and
amount of annuity payments to be made from said GRAT; and performing a
valuation of the stock options as each annuity payment is made and
determining the number of stock options to include in the annuity payment.
Id.
102 Id.
103 See generally U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999), available at
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (follow on-screen security
instructions; then search by "patent number, " inputting patent number
"6,567,790"; then follow "Transaction History" hyperlink) (showing '790 patent's
transaction history which lists no rejections).
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the inadequacy of the PTO. While this author has not studied
the patent closely, a superficial review of the patent's first claim
left me sympathetic to tax professionals' concerns regarding
validity. Interestingly, however, in the lawsuit involving the '790
Patent, the defendant filed its motion for summary judgment
based on a theory of non-infringement, not on a theory of
obviousness, perhaps indicating that it did not have a strong
obviousness argument. 10 4 Of course, the reason for filing a
motion based on non-infringement may have been pure litigation
strategy, and a motion regarding validity may have been
forthcoming. Whether the change in the law itself and/or
additional prior art renders the '790 Patent invalid will have to
wait because the parties agreed to settle the dispute in March
2007.105 Nevertheless, the Wealth Transfer case serves as a good
introduction to the criticisms surrounding business method and
tax strategy patents.
VI. REMEMBERING THE PAST: CRITICISMS OF BUSINESS METHOD
PATENTS
With the Federal Circuit's strong declarations that business
methods are eligible for patenting, many critics shifted their
focus to the PTO's perceived failure to adequately analyze
business method patents in light of the requirements of novelty
and non-obviousness.10 6 That is, these critics argue that the PTO
issues too many poor quality patents. 10 7 Other critics, however,
continue to maintain that business method patents, as a class of
inventions, should not be eligible for patenting as a matter of
public policy. This Section analyzes both categories of arguments
as they relate to business method patents, providing background
for a later discussion of similar concerns relating to tax strategy
104 See Dr. Rowe's Memorandum in Support of his Motion Pursuant to Rule
56(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement, Wealth
Transfer Group LLC v. Rowe, No. 3:06cv00024, (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2006).
105 Consent Final Judgment Regarding Settlement Agreement, Wealth
Transfer Group LLC v. Rowe, No. 3:06-cv-00024 (D. Conn. filed Dec. 1, 1999).
106 See, e.g., Andrew Kopelman, Note, Addressing Questionable Business
Method Patents Prior to Issuance: A Two-Part Proposal, 27 CARDozo L. REV.
2391, 2391 n.1 (2006) (citing, inter alia, David Streitfeld, Note: This Headline is
Patented, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at 1; Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd,
FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 44 (magazine); James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, 6 (Magazine), at 44; Dennis S. Karijala, Distinguishing
Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 443 n.19 (2003)).
107 Kopelman, supra note 106, at 2391.
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patents.
A. Quality of Patents Issued by the PTO
As stated above, some critics agree that certain business
method inventions may, in theory, be worthy of patent
protection, but they argue that the PTO issues too many patents
for obvious or non-novel concepts. One can easily point to
numerous absurd patents that have been issued over the years.
Particularly evocative examples (not all of which are business
methods) include patents for a method of selling merchandise to
golfers in conjunction with golf car rentals,108 a method of
swinging on a swing,10 9 a method of swinging a golf club, 110 a
method of exercising a cat with a laser,"' an internet reverse
auction method (Priceline.com), 112 and a method for allowing
internet shoppers to buy using only "one-click" of the mouse
(Amazon.com). 113  Critics highlight these and other patents as
proof of a flawed patent system, and point to three general
categories of alleged shortcomings: (1) shortcomings at the patent
application examination stage, (2) shortcomings in the patent
laws, and (3) shortcomings external to the patent system.
1. Shortcomings and Solutions at the Patent Application
Examination Stage
Some suggest that patent examiners lack adequate training
and resources to analyze business method patents because
business methods, being different from the stereotypical
mechanical widget, present unique challenges to examiners with
science and engineering, as opposed to business backgrounds. 114
108 U.S. Patent No. 6,457,317 (filed Jan. 22, 2001).
109 U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000).
110 U.S. Patent No. 7,112,150 (filed Jul. 8, 1999).
111 U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993).
112 U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (filed Sept. 4, 1996).
113 U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997); see also Amazon.com, Inc.
v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (litigating the '411
Patent). The Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com lawsuit settled under
confidential terms. Technology Briefing, Internet: Online Booksellers End
Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2002. The PTO granted a reexamination request
(reexamination number 90/007,946) for the '411 Patent on May 12, 2006, which
is still pending as of August, 2007. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12,
1997), available at http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (follow on-screen
security instructions; then search by "Control Number" inputting control
number "90/007,946").
114 See Kopelman, supra note 106, at 2393-94, 2419; see also JCT, supra note
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Of course, business methods do differ from mechanical widgets,
but one should have confidence that the PTO, charged with
constantly evaluating the newest and most cutting-edge ideas
and innovations, will be able to adapt and quickly gain expertise
in a new area. Stated differently, while business methods (PTO
class 705)115 differ from mechanical widgets this should not be
disconcerting insomuch as the PTO evaluates inventions from
diverse technology areas, including Apparel (Class 002);116
Chemistry/physical processes (Class 23);117 Plant husbandry
(Class 47);118 Sugar, starch, and carbohydrates (Class 127);119
Liquid purification or separation (Class 210);120 Electronic digital
logic circuitry (Class 326);121 Bee culture (Class 449);122 Drugs
(Class 514);123 Nuclear Technology (Class 976);124 and
7, at 27.
115 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR
MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS), Sec. III at 5,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menuibusmethp/whitepaper.pdf (white
paper version 1.43). To organize the vast array of patents and technical
documents in its databases, the PTO classifies patents and patent applications
into classes and subclasses based on the technology field. See LESTER HORWITZ,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 902.01 (8th ed. Aug. 2001).
116 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: APPAREL, (Feb. 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspcOO2/defsOO2.htm.
117 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: CHEMISTRY: PHYSICAL PROCESSES (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc023/defs023.htm.
118 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: PLANT HUSBANDRY, (July 2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc047/defs047.htm.
119 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: SUGAR, STARCH, AND CARBOHYDRATES, (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc127/defs127.htm.
120 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: LIQUID PURIFICATION OR SEPARATION, (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc210/defs2l0.htm.
121 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: ELECTRONIC DIGITAL LOGIC CIRCUITRY, (Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc326/defs326.htm.
122 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: BEE CULTURE, (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc449/defs449.htm.
123 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: DRUG, BIo-AFFECTING AND BODY TREATING COMPOSITIONS (Mar.
2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc5l4/defs5l4.htm.
124 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc976/defs976.htm.
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Nanotechnology (Class 977).125
Every time a subject area has generated new patent
applications, the PTO has eventually adapted to evaluate that
technology or idea, whether by training existing examiners or by
hiring new examiners with the pertinent expertise. 126 Due in
part to a lack of resources, the process of adaptation may not be
immediate, but most people agree that the PTO should have
more funding to allow proper examiner training and patent
application analysis. 127 In any event, the PTO revamped its
procedures for examining business method patents in the year
2000,128 and hired more examiners having significant business
expertise, increasing the number of business method patent
examiners from 12 in 1997 to more than 100 in 2006.129 Further,
the PTO updated its electronic databases to include more non-
patent literature (NPL) relevant to business method patent
applications. 130 Finally, it created partnerships with industry
associations and corporate entities to review and discuss
developing concerns. 131
The PTO's business method patent initiative, a rare instance of
a single class of inventions getting individualized attention, was
not without results. Before the initiative, the allowance rate for
business method patents in FY 2000 was 55%, compared to an
overall allowance rate of about 67% of patents during a similar
time frame. 132 After the initiative, the allowance rate decreased
to 45% in FY 2001 and to 30-35% in FY 2002.133 The decrease
125 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CLASSIFICATION
DEFINITIONS: NANOTEHCNOLOGY (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/classification/uspc977/defs977.htm.
126 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR
MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) IV.B-C
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/class705.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2008) [hereinafter U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE].
127 See FTC Report, supra note 15, at 10, 12.
128 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 126, at Sec. IV.
129 Id.; Wynn W. Coggins, Group Director, Tech. Ctr. 3600, Update on
Business Methods for the Business Methods Partnership Meeting slide 11 (June
19, 2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/partnership.pps (last
visited Oct. 8, 2008).
130 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 126, at Sec. IV.
131 See id. at Sec. VI.
132 MIKU H. MEHTA & LAURA MOSKOWITZ, BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A JUDICIAL HISTORY & PROSECUTION PRACTICE, 13, available at
http://www.ngb.co.jp/english/news/2004/200405.pdf (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology).
133 Id.
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continued, and in 2006 and mid-year FY 2007, the allowance rate
for business method applications was approximately 20%,
compared to the overall patent allowance rate of approximately
50% during the same time.134 Thus, the PTO's initiative appears
to have addressed a legitimate concern, and demonstrated the
PTO's responsiveness to new issues.
Through years of analyzing cutting-edge technologies and
through the business method patent initiative, the PTO has
shown an ability to adapt and improve itself to address new
areas of inventive activity. Assuming the PTO receives adequate
funding and retains good examiners, one would expect the PTO
to continue to provide adequate review of business method
applications. In fact, some have argued that the quality of
business method patents in the late 1990s was equal to or better
than that of the general patent pool. 35
2. Shortcomings and Solutions in the Patent Laws
The second category of criticisms against business method
patents is that the patent laws do not institute adequate
screening of business method patent applications to divide the
patentable from the un-patentable. Much has already been
written about how to change the patent laws and rules, both for
patents in general' 36 and for business method patents in
particular. 1 37
Currently, business method patents are evaluated in almost
134 Coggins, supra note 129, at slide 8; U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/advisory/reports/ppac_2007annualrpt.pdf.
135 John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1004 (2003) (noting that business method patents
in the late 1990's "may have been better than average" compared to the general
patent population).
136 See, e.g., FTC Report, supra note 15, at 3, 4; A Section White Paper:
Agenda for 21" Century Patent Reform, 2007 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. LAW 1,
available at http://www.abanet.orgt
intelprop/home/PatentReformWP.pdf [hereinafter IPL White Paper]; Joseph
Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative
Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 946 (2004); Carl
Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1017 (2004).
137 See Kopelman, supra note 106, at 2393-95; Robert P. Merges, As Many As
Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 584-87 (1999).
2008]
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the same manner as other applications. 138 One can argue,
however, that business method patents should be analyzed more
rigorously for obviousness than other types of patent applications
because business methods encounter less technological
impedances than, for example, the mechanical widget. 139 A
rigorous review of business method patents for obviousness need
not require a change in the patent laws, but rather may take the
form of more subtle judicial analysis, such as has been suggested
by some to already exist. 140
Along the lines of judicial analysis, the recent Supreme Court
decision in KSR141 may make it more difficult for business
method patents to overcome the obviousness hurdle. Before the
KSR decision, courts and the PTO generally would not combine
two or more references to render a patent claim obvious unless
the prior art contained an explicit "teaching, suggestion, or
motivation" ("TSM") for the combination.' 42 The KSR court,
however, overruled the Federal Circuit's "rigid" application of the
TSM test, noting that a court "need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim."143
The KSR court repeatedly emphasized that market forces can
prompt variations of known concepts and stated that "[iun many
fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious
techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that
market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive
design trends."' 44  The concept of market forces providing
motivation to combine prior art would appear to relate
particularly powerfully to business method patents, given that
business methods will be driven proportionally more by market
138 In one exception, as part of the PTO's business method patent initiative,
the PTO mandated secondary examination for all allowed applications to ensure
proper prior art searching and analysis. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, supra note 126, at Sec. V.
139 See Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against
Software and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 823, 843-49
(arguing that inventions involving technological risk, rather than economic or
market risk, are truly deserving of patents).
140 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1167 (2002) (stating that "there is some reason to
believe that the court is imposing a rather strict standard" in reviewing
software patents for obviousness).
141 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
142 See id. at 1730.
143 Id. at 1741.
144 Id.
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forces, rather than by scientific or technological advancement.
Thus, the KSR decision may provide a platform from which
courts and the PTO can scrutinize business method patents in a
manner better correlating to one having ordinary skill in the
relevant art.
3. Shortcomings and Solutions External to the Patent System
The third category of criticisms against business method
patents concerns problems external to the PTO and the patent
laws. The primary criticism in this regard is that business
method patents, unlike other technologies, lack adequate sources
of searchable prior art, and thus, the PTO issues non-innovative
patents. 145 Some claim that the lack of prior art in the business
method area should render the class of inventions non-patentable
for public policy reasons.' 46 The temporary lack of searchable
prior art, however, should not bar patents for business methods,
because it is technologically feasible and socially desirable to
increase the sources of searchable prior art.
Increasing sources of searchable prior art is technologically
feasible because businesses can increase both the amount and
quality of their publications relating to business methods.
Further, as mentioned in relation to the PTO's business method
patent initiative, 147 the PTO can create, improve, and maintain
quality business method prior art databases through industry
collaboration. Finally, third party competitors can increase the
PTO's prior art awareness by submitting prior art for PTO
review under Rule 99 submissions 148 and reexaminations. 149
145 See, e.g., Kopelman, supra note 106, at 2398-2401 (2006); Julie E. Cohen,
Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Technologies, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1178
(1995) ("[In the field of computers and computer programs, much that qualifies
as prior art lies outside the areas in which the PTO has traditionally has
looked.").
146 See Larry A. DiMatteo, The New "Problem" of Business Method Patents:
The Convergence of National Patent Laws and International Internet
Transactions, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 22-26, 40-41 (2002).
147 See supra Part VI.A. 1.
148 Third-party prior art submissions under 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 are filed during
the examination stage of a patent application and must: (1) be filed within 2
months of a patent application's publication; (2) include a fee (currently $180.00
pursuant to section 1.17(p)); (3) include a list and a copy of (up to 10) patents or
publications (including any necessary English language translations). See 37
C.F.R. §§ 1.17(p), 1.99 (2007). Further, a submission under Rule 99 "shall not
include any explanation of the patents or publications, or any other
information." Id.
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Increasing available prior art benefits society because it helps
prevent low quality patents and because the public can use,
improve upon, and build upon known art.
B. Should Business Methods Be Eligible Subject Matter for
Patenting?
Regarding the argument that businesses do not need the
patent system's incentives, this Article offers only two brief
comments. First, while the business world has many incentives
to innovate apart from the patent system, whether the patent
system brings the level of innovation to a more optimal point is
an empirical question, and it would be interesting to consider
empirical research on the question. Second, even assuming
businesses do not "need" the patent system's incentives to spur
innovation, the patent system offers another basic societal
benefit: public dissemination of ideas and innovation.1 50 The
quid pro quo of the monopoly grant is a patentee's public
disclosure of the invention. Such disclosure fosters additional
innovation because others may analyze, build upon, or design
around another's patent. Given critics' concerns over lack of
adequate prior art for business methods, a strong argument can
be made that the public disclosure fostered by the patent system
will spur innovation in the business method area because patents
(and any attendant increased published art) would serve both as
prior art to other patent applications and as a written record of
the state of the art.
VI. A FAMILIAR SONG: CRITICISMS OF TAX STRATEGY PATENTS
As mentioned, the Wealth Transfer case151 has accented a
previously obscure niche in the patent field. Not surprisingly,
because tax strategy patents resemble business method patents,
many criticisms of the latter carry over to the former. This
Section analyzes arguments that the PTO issues tax patents of
149 Reexamination requests (which may be ex parte or inter partes), unlike
Rule 99 submissions, are filed at any time after a patent has issued and must
include detailed explanations of how the prior art raises a substantial new
question of patentability. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 311; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.510, 1.915.
The fee for a reexamination request is much larger than for a Rule 99
submission, and is currently $2,520 for an ex parte request and $8,800 for an
interpartes request. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1)-(2).
150 See, e.g., FTC Report, supra note 15, at Executive Summary at 2.
151 See supra Section I (discussing the Wealth Transfer case).
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poor quality and that tax strategies should not be eligible subject
matter for patenting.
A. Quality of Patents Issued by the PTO
The '790 patent (involved in the Wealth Transfer case) has
drawn howls and jeers from the tax community because of its
perceived obviousness or lack of novelty. 152 As described in
Section V.B, supra, such criticisms for that particular patent may
be warranted. Obviously, one bad patent should not ruin the
entire system, and this Article attempts to analyze criticisms of
the patent system under the assumption that the system is
neither perfect nor beyond repair. In general, the criticisms of
the quality of issued tax strategy patents fall into three
categories of alleged shortcomings: 1) shortcomings of PTO
examiner expertise, 2) shortcomings in the patent laws, and 3)
shortcomings in the PTO's access to prior art.
1. Supplying Patent Examiners with Tax Expertise
Mirroring the criticism of business method patents generally,
critics assert that patent examiners lack training and expertise
to analyze tax law-intensive patent applications. 153 The rebuttal
to this criticism, as it was for business method patents generally,
is that the PTO has a long history of analyzing cutting-edge
technology and should be able to adapt and evaluate this new
area of interest. 54 Of course, this argument is premised on
adequate PTO funding and industry collaboration.
True to its history, the PTO has taken the initiative to get its
arms around tax strategy patents. Since 2004, the PTO has
collaborated with the IRS to discuss and study issues relating to
152 See, e.g., Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (Statement of
Dennis I. Belcher, Partner, McGuirewoods, LLP); Brian C. Banner, Note,
Patenting Tax Strategies: The Case for Excluding Legal Methods From the
Realm of Patentable Subject Matter, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 491, 507 (2007).
153 See Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (Statement of Ellen
Aprill, Assoc. Dean of Academic Programs, Professor of Law, and John E.
Anderson Chair in Tax Law, Loyola Law School).
154 Banner, supra note 152, at 496 (citing Hearing on Issues Relating to the
Patenting of Tax Advice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 13,
2006), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov (hover over "Committee
Hearings" hyperlink; then, from dropdown menu that appears, follow "109"'
Congress" hyperlink; then follow "Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting
of Tax Advice" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
20081
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tax strategy patents. 155 The collaboration seeks to improve
examiner understanding through task forces and workshops that
explore trends in the practice and the latest sources of
information. 156 The IRS also taught the PTO how to better
recognize tax strategies embedded in patent applications,5 7 and
trained PTO examiners on "financial products, wealth transfer,
and pensions." 158  Additionally, the PTO is cultivating a
relationship with the American Bar Association's Section of
Taxation to provide supplemental input and training for PTO
examiners. 159
In one interesting aspect of the PTO and IRS's collaboration,
the PTO and IRS have worked together to develop "a
protocol... [by which the PTO can] ... request that patent
applicants reveal specific [tax laws] and procedures affected by a
patent application." 60  Of course, because any tax laws
particularly relevant to a patent application qualify as prior art,
applicants have the affirmative duty to alert the PTO to such
laws of which they are aware, even absent any protocol.16'
Failure to alert the PTO of such laws known to the applicant at
the time of invention would, in most cases, constitute inequitable
conduct, and result in an invalidation of the patent. 162
In any event, the PTO has historically evolved with the
changes and growth of science and technology. The PTO has
likewise demonstrated its enthusiasm to equip itself to properly
evaluate tax strategy applications. Hence, any lack of tax
155 See Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (Statement of Hon.
Mark Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service).
156 Id.
157 See id. (Statement of J. Toupin, PTO General Counsel).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. (Statement of Hon. Mark Everson, Commissioner, Internal Revenue
Service).
161 See Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2008)
(regarding the patent applicant's duty to disclose any known information
material to patentability).
162 Inequitable conduct can be difficult to show because a party must
demonstrate that the applicant was aware of the prior art, that the art was
material, and that the applicant intended to deceive that PTO. Li Second
Family Ltd. P'ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Furthermore,
"[o]nce the threshold levels of materiality and intent have been established, the
trial court must weigh materiality and intent to determine whether the equities
warrant a conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred." Id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
(2008).
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strategy expertise has already been, or will quickly be, remedied.
In the meantime, "[t]he solution is not to banish the subject
matter to the commons, but to properly equip the personnel to
handle such applications effectively and efficiently."
163
2. Solutions in the Patent Laws
Short of prohibiting tax strategy patents or eviscerating them
by precluding recovery of damages for infringement, relatively
little has been written regarding what changes should be made to
the patent laws to better handle tax strategy patents.
a. Mandatory Publication for Tax Strategy Patent Applications
18 Months After Filing
One sensible recommendation is to publish all tax strategy
patent applications within 18 months of filing. 64 Mandatory
publication has been suggested for all patent applications, 165 but
holds particular appeal for tax strategy patents, which are based
on U.S. tax laws. In general, only if the applicant desires to file
the application in a foreign country must the application be
published. 166 While one might expect an inventor of a machine or
other "traditional" inventions to file for foreign protection
because the patent owner can build or sell the widget in many
countries, the same is not true for tax strategy patents that rely
on U.S.-specific tax laws. As a consequence, one might expect tax
strategy patent applications would not publish after 18 months,
given the correlation to the strategy and U.S.-specific tax laws.
Thus, the list of published patent applications may not give a
complete picture of what is "in the pipeline" as far as tax strategy
patent applications.
Mandatory publication at 18 months would have synergistic
effects. For example, it would bring the U.S. laws more into
163 Matthew A. Melone, The Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently
Unnecessary Development, 5 DEPAuL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 437, 459 (2007).
164 Ellen P. Aprill, Responding to Tax Strategy Patents, Loyola Legal Studies
Paper No. 2007-26,
http://www.abanet.org/tax/patents/articles/USCTaxIlnstitutePatentpiece.pdf
(Apr. 2007) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000)).
165 See IPL White Paper, supra note 136, at 25.
166 Since November 2000, the PTO publishes most patent applications 18
months after their earliest filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000). The PTO
will not, however, publish patent applications if the applicant files a request for
non-publication. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000). Applicants may only request
non-publication if they agree not to file the application in a foreign country. Id.
20081
HeinOnline  -- 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 359 2008
ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH.
alignment with the world, as many countries, including those in
Europe, publish all applications after 18 months. 167 Further, it
would increase the available prior art, making future
applications less likely to issue as patents. Finally, mandatory
publication would allow government and private entities to
oppose non-novel or obvious ideas and to monitor for potentially
abusive applications.
b. The Supreme Court's KSR Decision-"Market Demand" as a
Force in Obviousness Determinations
As mentioned, the Supreme Court's recent KSR decision may
affect the patentability of tax strategy patents based on whether
an invention would have been obvious.168 The KSR decision dealt
with the issue of obviousness, which involves the combination of
two or more pieces of prior art.169 Because all tax strategies are
based on tax laws and related regulations, tax strategy patents
will almost always represent the combination of those prior art
laws and regulations, thus making KSR and the obviousness
doctrine important to tax strategy patents. Additionally, the
KSR court's accentuation that in some fields "market demand,
rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends,"170 may
speak particularly strongly to tax strategy patents because the
over-arching market demand to lower a person's tax obligations
can provide a motivation to combine a variety of prior art
references.
Market demand tells an inventor what the invention should be
like, but does not tell the inventor how to make it. If the prior
art provides the technical know-how to make parts or features of
an invention then market demand can act as a bridge to connect
the prior art parts or features.
Although market demand may range from the broad to the
specific, courts and the PTO have little guidance regarding how
specific market demand must be to provide a motivation to
combine prior art. Looking to the KSR decision, one sees a
relatively specific market demand, the "strong incentive to
167 See European Patent Convention art. 93, Oct. 5, 1973, available at
http://www.epo.org.patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ar93.html (providing
that European patent applications must be published at least after 18 months).
168 KSR Int'l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007).
169 See supra Section V.B.
170 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
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convert mechanical [car] pedals to electronic pedals." 171 While
the electronic age has ushered in numerous mechanical-to-
electrical conversions, the KSR court would appear to require
device-specific market pressure to provide motivation to combine
references.172 In the context of a traditional mechanical widget
(such as a car pedal), the requirement of device-specific market
demand makes sense because numerous scientific and
technological factors can affect the design of a single widget.
What does a device-specific market demand look like in the tax
strategy area? Much like the mechanical-to-electrical example,
the market in the tax strategy area will encourage the use of a
specific law or device to lower tax obligations. Unlike the
mechanical-to-electrical example, however, where one can come
up with reasons why not to convert a mechanical pedal to an
electrical one (e.g., reliability, complications from electrical power
requirements, technological limits, cost, etc.), in the tax strategy
area, the demand to decrease taxes is always the same and
always desirable (as long as it is legal).
The ubiquity of the demand for lower taxes results in an
environment where KSR court's market demand theory has
strong applicability. Whenever a law is issued or changed, the
universal quest for combining it with other tax laws and
knowledge to reduce taxes begins. That is not to say that a tax
strategy is never worthy of a patent, but rather to note that
combinations of known technology in the tax strategy area
should be viewed skeptically because the combinations might be
obvious.
As an example of applying the market demand theory to tax
patents, recall the '790 patent involving funding a GRAT with
nonqualified stock options. 173 As discussed previously, GRATs
had existed long before the '790 patent. Recall also that the
application for the '790 patent stated that a change in Rule 16b-3
of the Security and Exchange Commission regulations allowed
nonqualified stock options to be transferred, including to
trusts.17 4 For this example, consider the laws relating to GRATs
171 Id. at 1744.
172 See id. at 1742 (discussing how in situations where "market pressure to
solve a problem... [with] a finite number of identified, predictable solutions"
exists, such pressure provides motivation to persons of ordinary skill to seek out
a solution from said identified or predicable solutions).
173 See supra Section V.B.
174 U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. 1, 1999).
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as lumped into "Law #1" and the change in Rule 16b-3 as "Law
#2." Also assume that Law #1 when combined with Law #2
teaches all the limitations of the '790 patent. 175
Before the KSR decision, many courts would have required a
specific statement in either Law #1 or Law #2, such as a
statement in the legislative history of Law #2 that the
amendment will permit stock options to be transferred to trusts,
to provide a motivation to combine Law #1 and Law #2. Absent
such a statement in the prior art itself, many courts would have
ruled that there was no motivation to combine the references.
Under KSR, in contrast, one might demonstrate a motivation to
combine the laws through literature or testimony demonstrating
a market demand to minimize tax consequences relating to the
stock options affected by the change in Law #2.176
Because tax practitioners have a common goal-legitimately
reducing tax obligations-motivating every transaction, analysis,
and "invention," the KSR court's market demand concept can
provide a significant bar to patentability of tax strategy patents.
Think of it this way: every time a change in the law relating to
taxes occurs, the first thing every tax practitioner does is analyze
that change in light of how the change can be combined with
other laws to reduce tax obligations of individuals and entities.
There exists an almost inherent market demand motivating the
combination of laws and regulations to produce tax savings.
Thus, courts and the PTO can and should aggressively interpret
175 This may not be the case, given that in the lawsuit involving the '790
Patent, the defendant filed its motion for summary judgment based on a theory
of non-infringement, not on a theory of obviousness, perhaps indicating that it
did not have a strong obviousness argument. See Dr. Rowe's Memorandum in
Support of his Motion Pursuant to Rule 56(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for Summary
Judgment of Non-Infringement, Wealth Transfer Group LLC v. Rowe, No.
3:06cv00024, (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2006), 2006 WL 3873114. Further, the '790
Patent includes limitations regarding how to calculate the amount of stock
options to include in the annuity payment. U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec.
1, 1999).
176 Arguably, one can demonstrate such market pressure by various articles
appearing in the wake of Rule 16b-3's amendment that discuss the potential
advantages of transferring stock options for tax reasons. See, e.g., Edward E.
Bintz, Executive Compensation-Transferable Stock Options: A Complex but
Valuable Estate Planning Opportunity, ARNOLD & PORTER, L.L.P., Aug. 1, 1997,
available at http://www.amoldporter.com/publications.cfm (search Type of
Publication "Articles" and Author "Bintz"; then follow "Executive Compensation'
article hyperlink) (stating that changes to Rule 16b-3 have lead to interest in
transferring stock options, including to trusts, "to reduce gift and estate taxes"
and that such options can be valued by Black Scholes or other valuation
methods).
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the KSR decision as a mechanism to provide heightened scrutiny
of tax strategy patents involving combinations of laws.
c. The Supreme Court's KSR Decision-"Predictability" as a
Force in Obviousness Determinations
A fundamental difference between tax strategies and
traditional widgets is that the workability and success of widgets
depends on the interactions of nature-based scientific laws, such
as physics and chemistry, whereas the success of tax strategies
depends only on a positive law created by statutes and
regulations. This fundamental difference is arguably at the
heart of most commentators' unease with tax strategy patents,
but the implications of the difference are not as far reaching as
some may suggest.
One implication of the difference between widgets and tax
strategies comes to the forefront in the KSR court's focus on
predictability in "combination" inventions.177 The KSR court
stated that the "combination of familiar elements according to
known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than
yield predictable results." 178 Considered in light of traditional
inventions, such as widgets, the issue of predictability can
provide a good litmus test for the obviousness of a purported
invention. For example, while Chemical A and Chemical B may
be known, mixing A and B together may have very unexpected
results--either positive or negative. Similarly, changing one part
of a complex mechanical or electrical device in light of another
piece of prior art may have difficulties because changing one part
may affect other parts unintentionally, or the prior art device
may need to be modified to work with different devices. Simply
stated, in traditional inventions, combinations of prior art may
not work for a variety of real-world reasons.
However, in the tax strategy area, combinations based on
changes in tax laws will, in theory, always "work" as expected
(although they may be illegal). Following the '790 patent
example, transferring stock options into GRATs has no chance of
failing due to an unaccounted for force of nature. Instead, in the
'790 patent, the stock option acts just like any other stock option,
and the GRAT acts just like any other GRAT. Of course, a
177 KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1739-41.
178 Id. at 1739.
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practitioner must be careful to ensure that the new structure
does not violate any interrelated law, but whether a strategy is
legal does not seem to determine whether it is patentable.179
Hence, the routine combination of a new or changed law with
existing law faces a difficult obviousness hurdle. As the KSR
court stated, "[w] hen there is a design need or market pressure to
solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions ... [and] this leads to the anticipated
success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary
skill and common sense."'8 0
While more traditional inventions must deal with numerous
variables that affect their success, including gravity, rust,
molecular interactions, material safety, material strength, and so
on, tax strategy patents need only weave through the web of tax
laws and related regulations. Thus, the court's emphasis on
predictability can and should have a pointed effect on tax
strategy patents because when combining the teaching of the
laws relating to nonqualified stock options and GRATs, the
results are not merely predictable, but 100% guaranteed! The
invalidating power of published law and regulations should be
particularly strong in the area of tax strategy patents.
d. A "State of the Law" Affidavit for Patent Applicants Will Guide
Examiners, Prevent Rent Seeking, and Preclude Pure Capture of
Tax Laws
Because tax laws will often serve as the most important pieces
of prior art to tax strategy patents, the PTO should create an
affirmative duty for the applicant to identify and summarize the
primary tax laws relevant to an alleged invention. This duty can
be fulfilled in a state of the law affidavit in which the applicant
discloses and describes how the current tax laws relate to the
alleged invention.' 8 ' Of course, applicants already have a "duty
to disclose to the [PTO] all information known [to that
179 See supra Section I-II (hypothesizing about the tax community patenting
illegal tax strategies and describing the four requirements for patenting, none
of which involve checking for legality of the invention).
180 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
181 A good example of the type of tax law discussion envisioned can be found
in the '790 patent's specification, which describes the most relevant laws
relating to transferable stock options and GRATs. See U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790
(filed Dec. 1, 1999). Perhaps an examiner with a stronger background in the
tax area would have considered the alleged invention obvious in light of the
change in the law.
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individual] to be material to patentability," 182 but they are not
required to affirmatively search for the relevant information.
The state of the law affidavit, however, would also require the
applicant to affirmatively search for and explain the relevance of
tax laws implicated under the inventions.18 3  Moreover, to
prevent "prophetic" patents, applicants must base their affidavits
on the actual current tax laws, rather than anticipated (or
lobbied-for) changes.
A state of the law affidavit fits nicely into existing patent
principles. For example, the requirement to search for and
explain the relevant tax laws would not burden applicants
greatly because they arguably must know the primary laws
relating to the invention, or else they would not realize they had
an invention in the first place. Further, the patent laws already
require an applicant to disclose the best mode for practicing the
invention and to enable one skilled in the art to practice the
invention, so the affidavit would only incrementally increase this
burden. 184
In addition, the affidavit would aid the examiner in
understanding whether the alleged invention conforms to the
current tax laws. As mentioned in Section IV of this Article,
courts and the PTO already have in place a framework to require
traditional "widget-type" inventions to conform to the known
laws of science through the Chilowsky test for specific utility.
The affidavit requirement would allow a test that mirrors the
Chilowsky test, but would be based not on science laws, but on
tax laws. Because tax laws, unlike the laws of science, change
regularly, the law should require applicants to present the
current laws to the patent examiner. If a patent is issued and
the affidavit is later shown to be incorrect, then the patent
should be invalid. Thus, much like patent applicants must
correctly apply the laws of physics and chemistry,18 5 tax strategy
182 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
183 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a)-(b) (noting that the individual must disclose
and explain all information that is relevant or material). Care must be taken to
identify what laws constitute "tax laws." For instance, the '790 Patent dealt
with a change in an SEC regulation. Those within the tax community would be
best suited to draft sufficiently inclusive language to capture the appropriate
laws and regulations.
184 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
185 See e.g., In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462 (1956) ("W]here the mode of
operation alleged can be readily understood and conforms to the known laws of
physics and chemistry, operativeness is not questioned, and no further evidence
is required.").
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applicants would be required to correctly state the tax laws and
apply them to the asserted invention.
Moreover, to prevent rent seeking and wildcatting,186 the
affidavit requirement should be based on the tax laws as they
exist at the time of the application. As discussed in Section IV,
the utility requirement arguably should prevent prophetic
patents based on guesses about future changes in the tax laws.
To the extent that the utility requirement does not prevent
prophetic applications, the affidavit would clearly do so.
Moreover, because tax strategy patents stand or fall based on
changes in the tax laws, the affidavit will act as a wall to
separate patent holders/applicants from the lawmakers who can
make or break a patent's worth. According to Professor Melone,
"tlax law is notoriously fertile ground for rent seeking and rent
extraction in the political arena."1 7 Supplemental evidence for
the legitimate fear of rent seeking stems from analogous
occurrences in industries with "standards-setting bod[ies]," such
as the cell phone industry. 88 While some have called for
mandatory licensing in similar situations, 8 9  given the
government's direct involvement in enacting tax laws, prophetic
tax strategy patents should be precluded to eliminate the
possibility or appearance of government corruption. 190
Further, the affidavit would assist in the PTO examiner's
analysis of the claimed invention's novelty and non-obviousness
in light of tax laws. Unlike the best mode requirement, which
does not limit the patent from including later-discovered modes
of operation, 191 the affidavit could provide a limiting effect on the
patent's scope by limiting the patent's reach to those areas of the
law disclosed in the specification. If an alleged infringer can
186 See supra Section IV.A (discussing the terms rent seeking and
wildcatting).
187 Melone, supra note 163, at 473.
188 See generally Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse through the Capture of
Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 632-3, 684 (2002).
189 See, e.g., Banner, supra note 152, at 504-05 (citing Janice M. Mueller,
Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH
L.J. 623, 684 (2002)).
190 See Melone, supra note 163, at 474 (discussing the disadvantages of rent
seeking with the tax strategy patents and noting that the perception of
unfairness in the tax arena can affect compliance).
191 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2165, 2165.04 (2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-e8r6-21OO.pdf (providing an
example of when the best mode requirement was satisfied even though
applicant did not disclose information relevant to the invention).
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demonstrate that the applicant's "status of the law" affidavit did
not cover the alleged infringing use, the alleged use will not
infringe. In this way, the applicant's burden of clarity is
heightened.
Finally, a "state of the law" affidavit requirement would help
police patent applications for abusive tax shelters. Interested
third parties could review the affidavit and challenge any
inconsistencies. While of course, accused infringers would be
slow to declare a tax strategy "abusive" if they might in fact be
performing the strategy, non-accused third parties should be
permitted to request reexamination based on an incorrect
statement of the tax laws.
3. The Need for Quality Searchable Prior Art
The third category of criticisms against tax strategy patents
concerns the lack of adequate sources of searchable prior art.
192
Commentators within the tax community differ on whether
adequate sources of searchable prior art exist, 193 and some
sources on the subject appear to be internally conflicted. 194 As
192 See Letter from Tax Section, New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section to
Congress (Aug. 17, 2006), available at
http://tax.aicpa.org/NR/rdonlyres/A8E1569D-7BDO-40FC-8172-
OF915AFA9F9E/0/2ndattachmentNYSTBAReportPatents.pdf [hereinafter
NYSBA letter].
193 Compare Melone, supra note 163, at 459 ("[T]here exists an extensive and
rich body of tax literature."), with NYSBA letter, supra note 192, at 7 ("In many
cases, strategies adopted by taxpayers are not publicly disclosed... Tax returns
are confidential, and tax advice is typically protected under the attorney-client
privilege or the practitioner privilege.").
194 Compare NYSBA letter, supra note 192, at 4 ("Our experience also
suggests that creative, sound tax planning ideas are generally available and
widely discussed among practitioners and in the tax literature."), with id. at 7
We believe that the practical difficulties of establishing or disputing the
originality of tax strategies strongly militates against giving them patent
protection.... In many cases, strategies adopted by taxpayers are not
publicly disclosed.... Tax returns are confidential, and tax advice is
typically protected under the attorney-client privilege or the practitioner
privilege...
Compare Wieland III & Marshall, supra note 68, at 127 (stating that "many tax
strategies are publicly discussed and disseminated among tax practitioners,"
including through practitioner seminars, publications, and published excerpts
of private letter rulings and technical advice memoranda), with id. at 140
(stating that "the attorney-client privilege may very well limit the scope of such
efforts" to develop prior art databases); compare AICPA, supra note 68, at 9
(stating that the tax profession is home to vast discussion that "support the
constant development, broad public exposure, analysis and refinement of tax
strategies"), with id. at 11 (stating that the PTO has limited access to tax
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with business methods in general, however, any temporary lack
of adequate searchable prior art should not bar tax strategy
patents, because increasing the searchable prior art is easily
attainable and socially desirable. 195
Tax professionals can increase the sources of searchable prior
art by increasing both the amount and quality of their
publications relating to tax strategies. Tax professionals
consistently describe their community's atmosphere as one of free
and open discussion of tax savings techniques, 196 so publishing
those discussions in a searchable database would require little
effort. The PTO has also collaborated with the IRS and industry
professionals to improve and maintain quality tax strategy prior
art databases. 19 Finally, third party competitors can increase
prior art awareness by submitting prior art for PTO review under
Rule 99 submissions and reexaminations.19s Increasing available
prior art benefits society because it helps prevent low quality
patents, and because the public can use, improve upon, and build
upon known art.199 Additionally, the desire to design around an
existing patent can lead to ancillary innovation. For these
reasons, many commentators agree that the temporary lack of
searchable prior art should not preclude patentability of tax
strategy patents. 200
strategy prior art because much of it "consists of confidential or privileged
communications" or "are not described in printed publications.").
195 See Melone, supra note 163, at 458-59.
196 Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (statement of Dennis
Belcher) ("Many lawyers, accountants, and financial planners give estate
planning advice and do not publish their techniques but discuss these
techniques in numerous meetings of professionals.").
197 See, e.g., id., supra note 7 (statement of Ellen Aprill) (recognizing ongoing
beneficial collaboration and encouraging further collaboration between the PTO
and tax professionals).
198 See supra Part VI.A.3 (discussing Rule 99 submissions and
reexaminations).
199 See, e.g., Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (1985)
(quoting State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (1985))
(discussing that a positive result of the patent system is an individual's ability
to build upon a patent in order to bring new innovations to the marketplace);
Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 179, 217 (2007) (discussing that increasing prior art will help in
invalidating bad patents); Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7
(statement of Ellen Aprill) (dicussing methods of increasing available prior arts
and its benefits, including an improved PTO review process, better
understanding by policymakers, and IRS access to undertake policy
considerations).
200 Richard S. Gruner, In Search of the Undiscovered Country: The Challenge
of Describing Patentable Subject Matter, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
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B. Should Tax Strategies Be Eligible Subject Matter for
Patenting?
Many commentators assert that tax strategies should not be
eligible for patenting on various public policy grounds. This
Subsection explores some of those concerns and offers responses
to the same.
1. Does the Tax Profession Need or Want the Patent System's
Incentives to Innovate?
Interestingly, the tax community disagrees on the optimal level
of incentive to innovate in the tax strategy area. Much like
Goldilocks' subjective assessment of the three bears' porridge,
some argue that the current level of incentive for tax strategies is
just right, while others argue that there is too much incentive.
One may also question whether there is too little incentive.
a. The Argument That the Tax Profession Has Adequate
Incentives to Create Is Oversimplified
Some critics of tax strategy patents assert that the tax
profession does not "need" the patent system's incentive to create
beneficial tax strategies.2 1' In its over-simplified form, this
argument assumes that because tax strategies existed before
patent protection became popular; the patent system is not
needed.202 But commercial incentives to innovate exist in almost
any industry, even without patent protection. 20 3 In other words,
TECH. L.J. 395, 434 (2007) (stating that a temporary shortage of strong prior art
"should probably not influence decisions about the proper scope of patentable
subject matter.").
201 See, e.g., Banner, supra note 152, at 497 ("People simply do not need the
promise of a limited monopoly to spur ingenuity in reducing their tax burden");
NYSBA letter, supra note 192, at 4; Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra
note 7 (Statement of Ellen Aprill).
202 U.S. Treasury, Fact Sheet on the History of the U.S. Tax System,
http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/taxes/ustax.shtml (last visited Oct.
8, 2008) (describing the U.S. tax system before the adoption of the U.S
Constitution).
203 See, e.g., Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does
and Should Patent Law Play?, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9 (1999) (providing an
example of one industry, Internet business methods, that does not need patents
to create an incentive to innovate). Of course, some industries have a higher
need for patents than others. For example, the pharmaceutical industry has
huge R&D costs and low copying costs, so it benefits highly from the patent
system. Judith Kaufmann, Intellectual Property Rights and the Pharmaceutical
Industry (Jan. 2006), available at
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the fact that tax professionals were developing tax strategies
before patenting them became prevalent does not by itself prove
that the patent system will not provide additional incentive to
innovate, thus bringing the level of innovation to a more optimal
point.20 4 Even without empirical evidence of the patent system's
benefits in the tax area, most observers probably acknowledge
that the patent system will add some fuel to the creative fire,
thus expanding the universe of beneficial tax strategies.
Arguments that tax professionals do not need the incentives of
the patent system are weakened by concerns that the profession
lacks adequate searchable prior art. 2 5 If the profession lacks
searchable and organized databases for prior art, then beneficial
information is not accessible to many professionals. 20 6  As
discussed with respect to business method patents, the public
disclosure mandated by the patent system fosters innovation
because others may analyze, build upon, or design around
another's patent. In addition to patents and published
applications, the patent system can foster other publications,
such as industry writings and commentary. Given concerns over
the lack of adequate searchable prior art for tax strategies, a
strong argument can be made that the public disclosure fostered
by the patent system will spur tax strategy innovation because
patents and any attendant increased published art would
advance the corporate understanding of the state of the art.
b. The Argument That the Tax Profession Needs Less Incentives
to Create Only Applies to Abusive Tax Strategies
Others within the tax community feel that tax professionals
have too much incentive to create, thus leading to abusive tax
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/industry.htm. Other industries
more analogous to the tax strategy area, however, receive patent protection,
including most business methods.
204 The trouble with the "optimal level of innovation" argument is that it
cannot be adequately supported or refuted without empirical evidence, and the
author has not found any such data relating specifically to tax strategies.
205 See supra Part VII.A.3 (discussing the existence of tax strategy prior art
that can be readily searched).
206 Cf. Paul Devinsky et al., Whose Tax Law Is It? Alarm Bells Should Ring
Over Rising Efforts to Patent Tax Strategies, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006
(discussing the confidential and protected nature of information that would be
prior art for tax strategies and advocating creation of a record and archive of
prior art. Because a tax advisor's work is typically confidential, there is little
prior art and, subsequently, little beneficial information available to tax
professionals).
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strategies. 2 7 One author goes as far as saying that "all tax
planning, not just planning associated with... [tax] shelters,
produces nothing of value."208 Arguments against incentives for
tax strategy patents presuppose that the strategies embodied in
the patents are or will be abusive. The IRS, however, has
conducted reviews of numerous tax strategy patents and patent
applications, and has yet to discover a patent that embodies an
abusive tax strategy.209
Aside from the absence of evidence of patents embodying
abusive structures, the public nature of patents militates against
fears of widespread abusive patents. Because the public has
access to all patents and those patent applications that publish
18 months after filing,210 applicants run serious risk of being
discredited if they try to patent an abusive strategy.211 The high
costs of applying for a patent 212 and the exponentially greater
costs of legal exposure if a patent turns out to be improper
provide weighty disincentives to patenting improper strategies.
213
The patent system will also allow the government to have
greater access to state of the art tax strategies, 214 allowing it to
make timely public announcements about the propriety of certain
strategies. 215 To the extent that the government needs greater
access to monitor potentially abusive patented strategies, the law
can be changed to make patented tax strategy transactions
reportable. 216 Making patented transactions reportable may be
207 See Melone, supra note 163, at 479-80.
208 David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REV. 215,
222 (2002).
209 Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (statement of Mark
Everson).
210 See supra Section VII.A.2.a (arguing for mandatory publication of all tax
strategy patents at 18 months).
211 See Drennan, supra note 96, at 314-15.
212 As discussed supra, filing a patent application and prosecuting it to
issuance can cost between $10,000 and $25,000 or more. See Lemley, supra note
17, at 1498.
213 See Drennan, supra note 96, at 317-19 (detailing the downfall of a reverse
split-dollar strategy that was the subject of three patent applications).
214 See Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (statement of Ellen
Aprill).
215 Id. But see Melone, supra note 163, at 470 ("At best, one should retain a
healthy skepticism toward claims that advance notice to the government will
have a significant impact in reducing abusive transactions.").
216 Letter from ABA Section of Taxation to The Honorable Mark W. Everson
(Feb. 21, 2007), available at
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commuploadTX800000/relatedresources/
CommentsonaNewCategoryof
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desirable for a number of reasons, including that some patent
drafters have mastered the art of saying very little of substance
in the pages of patent applications. 217
Thus, one can argue that the incentives of the patent system
benefit, or at least do not harm, the tax profession or tax
consumers. The public nature of patents decreases the chances
of abusive patents. Changing the law to make patented
transactions reportable seems desirable from a patent policy
standpoint to enable an additional check against abusive tax
strategy patents.
2. Assuming a Robust Database of Prior Art, Tax Strategy
Patents Will Not Unfairly "Capture" the Law
Some have argued that the government should ban tax
strategy patents because, in theory, someone could "capture"218 a
primary benefit of (or the only means of) compliance with a
certain tax law. 219 Although this Article supports precluding
prophetic patents,220 it does not support precluding even broad
patents based on current tax law, provided they comply with the
requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. The argument that
tax patents can "capture" a law stems from either a
misunderstanding of or lack of faith in the current patent laws
and the PTO. While the latter is understandable given the
human fallibility of PTO examiners, 221 we should not throw out
ReportableTransactionsCoveringPatentedTaxStrategies.pdf; JCT, supra note 7,
at 23 ("[T]he IRS and Treasury could amend the reportable transaction
regulations to include the application, grant, or use of a tax strategy patent.");
Drennan, supra note 96, at 313-14.
217 See Brenner, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting "the highly developed art of
drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful information as
possible"); see also Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (statement of
Mark Everson) ("Ultimately, we often need to see a real world example of how
the transaction is carried out before we can be confident that the transaction is
not abusive."); supra Part VII.A.2.d (suggesting that a "state of the law"
affidavit can place a higher burden of clarity on applicants for tax strategy
patents).
218 See supra note 87 (regarding this author's understanding of the definition
of "capturing" a tax law).
219 See, e.g., Wieland III & Marshall, supra note 68, at 129; Hearing on
Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (statement of Dennis Belcher); AICPA,
supra note 68, at 5, 9.
220 See supra Part VII.A.2.d.
221 A widely publicized case like the SOGRAT patent should not cause the
public to lose all hope. Even assuming the '790 patent was truly obvious at the
time of its application, the decision whether tax strategies should be eligible for
patenting should not be made based on this patent alone.
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the baby with the bath water. Instead, the modifications to the
patent system described in this Article provide sufficient
assurance that, for the most part, only deserving tax strategy
patents will issue.
At its core, the assertion that patents would unfairly preempt
other people's use of a tax strategy ignores one of the basic
premises of the patent system: If the inventor of the tax strategy
had not invented the strategy and disclosed it to the public,
people would have never known the strategy existed, and thus
would not have been deprived of something to which they are
entitled. Even assuming independent invention of a tax strategy
(after the patentee's invention date and without the benefit of the
patentee's disclosure), the patent system purposefully precludes
the later inventor's use to provide an incentive to create.
Arguments that multiple people would have independently
invented a given tax strategy is an indicia that an invention is
obvious, not a reason to bar tax strategy patents altogether.
This Article's discussion of the topics of novelty and
obviousness 222 should bring comfort to those who fear that an
entire area of the tax law could be preempted by a patent.
Almost by definition, absent a prophetic patent, one could not
patent the only means of compliance with a new law, because the
prior art embodied in the law itself (including draft legislation)
would either anticipate or render obvious all or most of the
explicitly intended applications of the law. Similarly, fears that
non-novel or obvious tax strategies will issue should be met with
strengthening examiner training and access to prior art, not with
pulling the plug on a segment of the patent world.
That being said, this Article contends that ideas worthy of a
patent may utilize various laws and regulations in such a way as
to lower one's tax obligations, but this is a far cry from
preempting an entire area of the law. Instead, patenting one
method does not preclude other tax strategies involving the same
assets or vehicles. Consider again the '790 patent: If valid, the
'790 patent does not preclude all tax reducing strategies
involving nonqualified stock options, but only those using a
GRAT per the claims. One can still reduce the tax consequences
of nonqualified stock options by transferring the options to
vehicles other than a GRAT.
Thus, the fears of capturing tax laws appear to be exaggerated.
222 See supra Section V.
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By preventing prophetic patents and strengthening the review of
tax strategy patent applications, only those tax strategies that
would otherwise lie dormant until a later time will receive patent
protection. While a "bad" (i.e., obvious) patent will undoubtedly
issue from time to time, the exception should not bring down the
rule.
3. Tax Strategy Patents Do Not Act as Undesirable Roadblocks or
Tollbooths to Compliance With the Law
Some have argued that the government should ban tax
strategy patents because an accumulation of tax strategy patents
will impede taxpayers' access to tax-savings strategies by
blocking them or forcing them to license one or more strategies. 223
It is quite correct that patents can impede others' access to
performing patented tax-savings strategies, for that is the nature
of the patent system. Deadweight loss due to monopoly is the
quid pro quo for disclosure of the idea via a patent application. 224
But again, if the invention is novel and non-obvious, the public
would not have known of the strategy absent the inventor's
ingenuity.
a. Tax Strategy Patents Do Not Block "Compliance" With the
Law
Some argue a step further that tax strategy patents will act as
a roadblock to prevent "compliance" with the law, 225 but the
doctrines of novelty and non-obviousness demonstrate this
characterization to be a straw man 226 in that an entire law
cannot be captured by a patent.227 In addition, tax strategies
receiving patents thus far only involve ways to reduce the
amount of taxes owed, not ways to physically pay one's taxes.
223 See, e.g., Hearing on Patenting Tax Advice, supra note 7 (statement of
Dennis L. Belcher); NYSBA letter, supra note 192, at 5.
224 But see Melone, supra note 163, at 471-72 (arguing that the deadweight
loss due to monopoly may be small for tax strategy patents).
225 AICPA, supra note 68, at 9. The AICPA's article argues that if a taxpayer
enters into certain transactions, filing of certain tax returns are required by
law. It goes on to argue that if the taxpayer must implement a patented tax
strategy to file the return, then the patent prevents compliance with the law.
The obvious response is that taxpayers should not enter into transactions in the
first place if they cannot report the transaction without infringing a patent.
226 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1461 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "straw man" as
"[a] fictitious person, esp. one that is weak or flawed.").
227 See supra Section VII.B.2 (regarding "capturing" the law).
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For example, an individual wage earner complies with the law by
paying taxes based on his adjusted gross income ("AGI").
22s
Assuming he qualifies to reduce his AGI based on charitable
giving, he can comply with the law whether he accounts for his
charitable giving or not, he just pays more taxes if he fails to
account for his charitable giving. Similarly, a certain patented
strategy may exist that can lower the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income, but he can comply with the requirement to pay income
taxes without using the patented strategy. Of course, he must
pay more than one who uses the strategy, but he can comply with
the law.
The argument that tax strategies are somehow different from
other inventions because paying taxes is mandatory229 suffers
from an additional weakness. While paying taxes is mandatory,
paying the minimum amount of taxes is not mandatory.
230 It is
like trying to argue that because drinking water is necessary for
humans to live, patents relating to purifying drinking water
should be prohibited. On the contrary, one is free to drink water
that is less purified, but one may prefer to pay more for water
purified by a patented method. Paying more taxes or drinking
slightly less pure water may seem unpleasant, but neither will
kill you.
One commentator recognizes the possibility of the patent
system providing added incentive to innovate for tax
professionals, but frames "the mandatory nature of tax[ation]"
argument as follows: in a normal industry, a company incurs a
net cost to embark on research and development, but in the tax
area, because taxpayers are required to pay taxes, they begin
with a net loss and any tax strategy results in a net gain. 231 This
argument improperly compares apples to oranges because the
228 See generally Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2007); Internal
Revenue Service, 2007 Adjusted Gross Income (AGI),
http://www.irs.gov/app/freeFile/html/moreInfo/more-info-ag.html (last visited
Oct. 8, 2008).
229 Banner, supra note 152, at 500 (arguing that "the mandatory nature of
paying taxes provides an important distinction that will not apply to other
areas encompassed by our patent system" because in other industries, the
company can cease production of a good); see also NYSBA letter, supra note 192,
at 4 ("The tax laws, however, are perhaps unique in that they impose universal
affirmative obligations of compliance on U.S. citizens and residents.").
230 See Melone, supra note 163, at 482 ("To date no one has asserted that all
taxpayers must have equal access to tax minimization techniques. Such an
assertion would be tantamount to a call for equal access to good tax advice.").
231 Banner, supra note 152, at 498.
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party most analogous to the researching company is the
researching tax professional, not the taxpayer.
That is, a tax professional incurs a cost for studying the tax
law and developing a strategy in much the same way that an
individual incurs a cost for tinkering with an idea or developing a
business strategy. The taxpayer is more analogous to the
consumer of goods, both of whom benefit from the inventor's
development and who, absent the inventor, would have no way of
receiving the benefit of the invention absent independent
invention. In sum, it seems no tax strategy patent yet issued
prevents compliance with the law, and no such patent can issue
assuming a properly running patent system and the
unavailability of prophetic patents. To the extent that the law
requires filing tax returns for certain business transactions,
entities should avoid the transaction if the tax returns will run
afoul of a patented strategy.
b. Tax Strategy Patents are Not Unfair Tollbooths
Another argument states, in effect, that tax strategies operate
as burdensome tollbooths preventing access to the entitlement of
tax strategies. This tollbooth argument is a less-compelling
version of similar arguments made in the field of steroid patents
in the 1960s and research tool 232 patents in the 1990s. 233 In the
cases of steroids and research tools, researchers wanted to use
the patented items for basic fundamental research.2 34 In those
scenarios, the patented items were arguably keys to future
scientific development. 21 Some suggested that patents on these
basic building blocks of research were detrimental to science
because the royalties researchers would pay would become
232 The National Institutes of Health broadly defines research tools as "the
full range of resources that scientists use in the laboratory... [which include,
but are not limited to,] cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal
models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug
targets, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment
and machines, databases and computer software." Report of the National
Institutes of Health, Working Group on Research Tools, June 4, 1998, available
at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/#backgrnd.
233 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998,
at 699 (arguing that patenting of upstream biotechnology research tools can
deter innovation in the field of basic biological research by acting as
"tollbooth[s] on the road to product development.").
234 Id. at 698-99.
235 Id. at 698.
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prohibitive, thus halting research. 236 No strong parallel exists
with tax strategy patents. Patented tax strategies do not
preclude other professionals from inventing or exploring
additional tax strategies. On the contrary, they arguably spur
more ideas.
Instead, some critics of tax strategy patents seem simply
indignant at the thought of paying license fees for access to
strategies, probably because they believe the strategies would be
discovered absent the patent system. Thus, the question of
whether tax strategy patents are unfair tollbooths is subsumed
in the question of whether society benefits on the whole from tax
strategy patents. While patents will raise the costs to tax
strategy consumers via royalty, it will also lower costs by
providing access to strategies that otherwise would not exist.
One must at least pause to consider the irony of tax
professionals complaining about patent holders and other
individuals profiting from tax strategies. Tax professionals have
been making money-and lots of it-from tax strategies for
years, so why should they have a monopoly on the area? Paying
a patent holder fees for the right to use a strategy is not unlike
paying tax professionals to get access to their knowledge and
expertise. In both cases, the taxpayer only gets access to certain
strategies by paying.237 It is true that with the patent system,
the restriction to the patented tax strategy is backed by the very
government that enacted the tax laws on which the strategy is
based, but this does not seem a convincing reason to exclude tax
strategy patents altogether. The patent system coexists with
other government laws and regulations, including pollution laws,
under which a patented invention may be the only or best means
of compliance with the law.
23 8
Critics also seem annoyed at the increased effort required for
tax professionals to analyze and confront tax strategy patents
236 Id. at 699. But see John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, SCIENCE, May 1,
1998, at 689 (responding to Heller and Eisenberg and arguing that similar
arguments against patenting polymer building blocks made in the 1960s failed
to come to realization).
237 To be fair, patent lawyers are not without financial reasons to desire tax
strategy patents: they stand to profit from tax strategy patents because they
will need to advise tax practitioners about the existence, strength and relevance
of patented tax strategies. In addition, patent lawyers may profit from
litigation and transactions relating to tax strategy patents.
238 See Warren F. Schwartz, Mandatory Patent Licensing of Air Pollution
Control Technology, 57 VA. L. REv. 719, 720-23, 726 (1971).
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posing legal barriers, calling the burden unacceptable given the
already burdensome task of contending with the labyrinth of tax
laws. 239 While patents will add additional dimensions to the tax
strategy area, other complex industries have dealt with patents
for years, and the tax profession does not appear to have any
inherent quality that should insulate it from any inconveniences
accompanying the patent system. The unfortunate complexity of
the tax laws may justify changes to the tax laws, but should not
be grounds for limiting the patent system.
Indeed, tax strategy patents may engender some clarity to the
tax laws by highlighting the state of the art for both the public
and the government. 240 Further, the public nature of patents,
coupled with patent owners' commercial incentives to distribute
widely their patented tax strategies, should result in patented
strategies being streamlined to consumers. Although some see
"commodifying" tax laws as undesirable,241 it can be argued that
such commodification increases access to good strategies and
helps others make sense of complex laws. Given the potential
benefits of the patent system, the predilection for equilibrium in
the tax profession should not hinder the otherwise
unobjectionable development.
4. Tax Strategy Patents Will Not Affect Taxpayer Morale
There are several reasons to doubt contentions that tax
strategy patents will increase disillusionment with the tax
system by violating horizontal taxpayer equity (the idea that
similarly situated taxpayers should pay similar taxes) 242 and/or
horizontal infringer equity (the idea that all infringers should be
treated alike).243 First, even the critics suggesting the problem
239 See Melone, supra note 163, at 465 (arguing that tax strategy patents
"inexorably leadf to further complications in tax planning and compliance").
240 See supra Section VII.B.1.
241 See Melone, supra note 163, at 483-84.
242 Drennan, supra note 96, at 280-81 (describing horizontal taxpayer equity
as "the notion that similarly situated taxpayers should pay similar taxes," and
arguing that excluding non-patent holders from access to strategies will cause
taxpayers to "view the tax system as unfair and arbitrary").
243 The term "horizontal infringer equity" is used in this article to describe
the situation discussed in Professor Melone's article in which some tax strategy
patents may be more easily enforced that others, thus causing similarly
situated taxpayers (those who infringe tax strategy patents) to experience
different consequences. See Melone, supra note 163, at 476-78. Professor
Melone suggests that disparate patent enforcement will lead to taxpayer's
"perceptions that the tax system is gamed and subject to manipulation,"
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concede that tax strategy patents will predominantly impact only
the most sophisticated and affluent consumers. 244 To the extent
that wealth approximates sophistication (or at least access to
sophisticated advisors), disillusionment from misperception
should be underwhelming. These sophisticated consumers will
comprehend why tax strategy patents do not greatly affect
horizontal taxpayer equity, as discussed in this Article and
elsewhere. 245  Regarding any perceived lack of horizontal
"infringement" equity, the sophisticated consumer will
understand that disparate patent enforcement relates not to an
unfair tax system, but to the constraints-and even the whims-
of the patent owner. Thus, tax strategy patents should not affect
the taxpayer morale.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Generally speaking, lawyers do not like change. Many
objections to tax strategy patents echo those made by other
professionals when patents first entered their fields. The patent
system brings with it costs as well as benefits, and the growth of
tax strategy patents counsels for harnessing the benefits of the
patent system while minimizing the costs. In this regard, this
Article suggests the following changes in the law:
* instituting a "state of the law" affidavit requiring patent
applicants to base tax strategy patent applications on current tax
laws and to identify and explain the primary tax laws relevant to
an alleged invention; 246
* reviewing all tax strategy patents under a strict
obviousness standard based on the recent KSR v. Teleflex
Supreme Court case; 247
* requiring notifications to clients and prospective clients
that patented tax strategies are not necessarily legal;
248
resulting in "corrosive effects on the voluntary compliance system." Id. at 478.
244 Id. at 460 (stating that "tax strategy patents will likely have their
greatest impact on large, complex businesses"); see also, supra Section V. n.71
(arguing that tax strategies for routine tax strategies likely to apply to the less
wealthy would be obvious).
245 See supra Section VII.B.3; see also Melone, supra note 163, at 482. In
addition, to the extent that certain patents cannot practically be enforced
(because of difficulty finding infringers), one would expect entities will not pay
the costs to obtain a patent they cannot enforce.
246 See supra Section VII.A.2.d.
247 See supra Section VII.A.2.b and c.
248 See supra Section IV.B.
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* mandating publication for all tax strategy patent
applications within 18 months from the application date; 249 and
* amending the tax laws to make the use of patented tax
strategies reportable transactions. 250
While the PTO may have been somewhat unprepared to deal
with the earliest tax strategy patents, it has taken measures to
properly analyze and understand such applications in the future.
In addition to the PTO's initiatives, the suggestions in this
Article should strengthen the quality of issued tax strategy
patents. Minimizing the issuance or viability of "bad" tax
strategy patents will result in a patent system whose value to the
public correlates to the value of the tax planning profession as a
whole. Thus, interested parties should focus their efforts not on
eliminating tax strategy patents, but on increasing the quality of
issued patents and improving the tax laws under which any such
patents would operate.
249 See supra Section VII.A.2.a.
250 See supra Section VII.B.I.b.
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